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CULTURES OF COMPLIANCE
Donald C. Langevoort*
INTRODUCTION
In mid-2015, the American Law Institute began a project to draft principles of
legal compliance in organizations.1 The task is challenging, but worth the effort.
Today, compliance—a key form of preventive law—attracts a rapidly increasing
amount of corporate attention and resources.2 Common practices seem to diffuse
from business to business more from conformity pressures than from hard
evidence of what works and what doesn’t. To quote one unusually candid
compliance officer: “In the end, do we know if we have an effective program? We
haven’t figured that out yet. We do know we have a program in size. We just don’t
know if it works.”3 Consultants and vendors advocate a seductive (and often
expensive) set of ideas, products and services to corporate officers and directors in
the name of self-protection, abetted by in-house compliance personnel who covet
the additional resources and status that come from increased company investments
in the effort. Government enforcers now claim compliance as their territory to
police, about which executives are especially wary. In sum, compliance is
fascinating, important, and worthy of sustained, systematic study.4
Socio-legal scholars who study white collar crime have long been interested
in the preventive mechanisms that reduce the reputational and liability risk that
organizations face when managers and employees misbehave, and researchers
interested in corporate law have been commenting on the viability—and
genuineness—of these mechanisms from social deviance and agency cost perspec-
* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to Miriam
Baer, Jim Fanto, Cristie Ford, Michael Kang, Arthur Laby, Josh Teitelbaum, Urska Velikonja, David Vladeck,
workshop participants at Emory and Georgetown, and attendees at the Dunbar Lecture at Fordham and the NYU
Conference on Compliance: New Risks, Challenges and Approaches, for helpful comments. © 2017, Donald C.
Langevoort.
1. American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Compliance, Enforcement and Risk Management at
Corporations, Nonprofits and Other Organizations, https://www.ali.org/projects/show/compliance-enforcement-
and-risk-management-corporations-nonprofits-and-other-organizations/.
2. Many articles have described this corporate response in detail. E.g., Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance
in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2099–2105 (2016).
3. Id. at 2106.
4. To this end, NYU has created a Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement; its blogsite is available
at https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/. The first compliance casebook has emerged for adoption in law
schools. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE (2014).
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tives for quite some time. That much is not new.5
What has changed is the level of external pressure for the adoption of extensive,
state-of-the-art compliance systems. Especially insistent have been criminal pros-
ecutors from the Department of Justice, who—with prompting from the Organiza-
tional Sentencing Guidelines—have made the quality of compliance at a given
firm relevant to both charging decisions and the level of fines and reform sanctions
sought or imposed.6 Non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements rou-
tinely impose intrusive governance and compliance reforms on corporations in the
apparent belief that they will make recidivism less likely.7 There is now a
dedicated compliance specialist at DOJ.8 Other federal agencies are part of this
campaign as well, in their civil enforcement efforts and in the oversight of
supervisory and risk management responsibilities for firms under their jurisdic-
tion.9 Not surprisingly, this increased stress on compliance is global, not just
domestic.10 As a result of the increase in demand, much more scholarly and
practice-focused attention is turning to compliance in a pressure-cooker world.11
Much of it is critical of current policies and practices.12
5. A classic study is CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR (1975).
6. See Julie R. O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of Corporations” Charging
Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Means for the Purposes of the Federal Criminal
Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 36–37 (2014).
7. For data on the kinds of compliance and governance changes required, see Wulf Kaal & Timothy Lacine,
The Effect of Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance:
Evidence from 1993-2013, 70 BUS. L. 1 (2014). On the many issues raised by these practices, see BRANDON
GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014). See generally
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT (Anthony Barkow &
Rachel Barkow, eds., 2011). As to SEC settlement practices, see Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 795.
8. See DOJ Compliance Expert Focuses on Real-World Applications, Not Legal Jousting, 48 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 1379 (July 11, 2016).
9. This is especially so in financial services. For an excellent collection of materials, see DAVID H. LUI & JOHN
H. WALSH, MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES AND FINANCE (2015). Environmental law,
privacy law, healthcare law, foreign corrupt practices, and defense contracting are other compliance hot spots, and
anti-terrorism efforts are quickly knitting together many different regulatory subject areas where businesses are
increasingly called upon to be on the lookout and assist in fighting terror threats.
10. E.g., John H. Walsh, A History of Compliance, in LUI & WALSH, supra note 9, at 49–60.
11. E.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009); D. Daniel
Sokol, Policing the Firm, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785 (2013); James Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A
Reorientation of Compliance for Broker-Dealers, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1121; Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of
Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J. CORP. L. 769 (2014); Griffith, supra note 2; Todd Haugh, The
Criminalization of Compliance, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id2752621. For other discussions, see sources cited infra notes 28, 42–46.
12. A number of prominent legal scholars have recently made the point that another conceptual darling of
regulators today—corporate governance, especially the role of independent directors—has been similarly
misconstrued and misapplied. See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation through
Non-Prosecution, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2731351; Lawrence Cunningham, De-
ferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 65 FLA. L.
REV. 1 (2014); Griffith, supra note 2. On the politics of director independence, which extends well beyond this
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In the last few years especially, lawmakers have increasingly invoked culture as
something crucial to good compliance. The phrase “culture of compliance” has
thus made its way into common legal discourse as describing both a goal and a
marker.13 Precisely what they mean by this is contestable, but there is enough
evidence that the demand for healthy compliance culture is serious to invite careful
thought.14 What is it, or should it be, and how might we know? That is my topic
here.
Practitioners may cringe at academics’ wish for inclusion in this discussion,
fearing interventions that are impenetrable and pretentious. Corporate cultures are
inseparable from the larger societal culture, which can set off abstruse definitional
and substantive debates. (Marx and Weber appear in serious academic incanta-
tions, along with post-moderns like Foucault15 and Derrida.) This article will try to
stay as grounded and helpful as possible to regulators, lawyers, and the growing
legions of compliance personnel, in the constructive spirit of the ALI project.
Empirical social science work relating to how cognition and culture in business
organizations affect law-abidingness (and much else) is burgeoning, and offers
many useable insights.16 Yet practice in the field—by the regulators who insist on
cultural interventions, or the lawyers and compliance people who have to carry out
the mandates—has not yet been particularly well informed by what we know or
surmise, but rather based more on hope or intuition. That is a problem, at least if
the cultural turn in compliance is serious.
So, what follows is a series of observations drawn from different social
sciences—economics, psychology, sociology and anthropology—about cultures
of compliance and noncompliance. Culture is crucial to good compliance and
therefore worth the government’s attention. However, as with so many social
phenomena, unexpected consequences and connections abound, defying easy
manipulability in some preferred direction. A recent empirical study illustrates the
particular subject, see Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 91 N.C. L. REV. 855
(2014).
13. E.g., Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization May Not Be the
Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71 (2014); Miriam H. Baer, Too Vast to Succeed, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1109, 1115
(2016); Griffith, supra note 2, at 1093. A particularly strong statement from a New York Federal Reserve Board
official is Thomas C. Baxter, The Changing Face of Corporate Compliance and Corporate Governance, 21
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 61 (2016).
14. Scholarly interest in the criminal law of corporate culture and character is not new. See, e.g., Pamela Bucy,
Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1991); Susanna
M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The Applicability of the Character Evidence Rule to Corporations,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 763.
15. To whom citations regarding compliance are actually quite apt. See Fanto, supra note 11, at 1148–51.
16. E.g., LINDA K. TREVI˜NO & GARY WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: SOCIAL
SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES (2003); Henrich R. Greve, Organizations Gone Wild: The Causes, Processes and
Consequences of Organizational Misconduct, 4 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 53 (2010). For my commentaries (with
citations relating to this literature) on behavioral challenges to securities regulation and enforcement, see DONALD
C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR
PROTECTION (2016).
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complicated connections between culture and corporate outcomes.17 The widely-
publicized hacking of the Ashley Madison dating website (for adulterous affairs)
offered researchers a trove of data, and it wasn’t difficult to then draw from
publicly-available SEC disclosures to identify top executives at public companies
who were cheating on their spouses via that presumably private service. Hence the
question: is legal compliance at companies with greater than average clusters of
adulterers different from others? Using various metrics of corporate law-
abidingness (e.g., subsequent financial misstatements), the answer was—at the
level of statistical significance—yes. Upper-echelon character seems to matter
beyond merely personal affairs, which is relevant to an important debate about
culture and compliance.
Interesting enough, but that was not the punch line of the study. Rather it was
that companies with higher incidence of executive-cheaters were also more
creative and inventive, with higher incidence of patent grants and other tangible
indicators of innovation.18 That would not surprise psychologists, who have
uncovered solid experimental evidence linking cognitive creativity and unethical
behavior.19 But it illustrates the conundrum that the origins of noncompliance may
be found in seemingly benign—even prized—behaviors, traits and cultural arti-
facts that are thought to generate success in a hyper-competitive marketplace. A
healthy-seeming celebration of creativity can also be a compliance danger sign, in
other words. The point here is not that compliance should be demoted in the name
of innovation, but simply that once we start trying to nudge culture, we may get
more than the desired response, if we even get that.20 Those engaged in promoting
better compliance have to be good students of the social science, not naı¨ve
intuitionists.
The goal for regulatory and self-regulatory actors is to know how to assess the
difference between good and bad compliance systems and cultures, or more
precisely, how to array any given system on the lengthy continuum running from
good to bad. This requires a deep anthropological knowledge of the firm and its
people in the face of ample incentives to dress up to fool the casual visitor. We are
far enough along in the law of compliance that all major firms do something in the
name of compliance, often with checklists at hand of “to do” items. Successful
17. William D. Greiser et al., Fifty Shades of Corporate Culture, (June 28, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id2741049.
18. Id. at 16–18.
19. See Francesca Gino & Dan Ariely, The Dark Side of Creativity, 102 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 445 (2011);
see also Francesca Gino & Scott S. Wiltermuth, Evil Genius? How Dishonesty Can Lead to Greater Creativity, 25
PSYCHOL. SCI. 973 (2014).
20. Todd Haugh uses the example of Intel’s antitrust compliance, which received plaudits for its aggressive,
cutting edge approach. David Yoffie & Mary Kwak, Playing by the Rules: How Intel Avoids Antitrust Litigation,
79 HARV. BUS. REV. 119 (2001). Not long thereafter, Intel found itself in massive antitrust trouble, with some
suspicion that not only did the style of its compliance program fail to deter the problem; it may have contributed to
it. Haugh, supra note 11, at 2–5, 58–59.
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firms are usually adept at impression management,21 and managers and employees
often believe their own myths. The masks they wear will not be easy to see
through.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines culture of compliance norma-
tively, in a way that differentiates it from compliance in the name of corporate
self-protection (and hence collective self-interest). It also traces the evolution of
culture as an aspect of compliance in both academic research and regulatory
interest, and fits the exploration of compliance cultures into the broader fabric of
culture generally, especially in highly competitive firms. Part II explores the new
obsession with ethical cultures, and how they, in turn, connect to broader theories
of organizational behavior and behavioral ethics. Part III examines the dark side of
cultures: how a variety of unconscious cognitive forces push back against efforts to
promote ethicality, and why the dark side often triumphs. Then, Part IV traces the
scripts that subtly convey dark side values in neutralized terms, such as narrow
interpretations of law or denigration of the legitimacy of the law’s demands. Part V
seeks to be constructive, with lessons for both firms and government policy-
makers about the consequences of seeing compliance as something embedded
within a largely unconscious cultural struggle, and ways to edit the dark side
scripts.
I. COMPLIANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. The ABCs of Compliance
If the law imposes the right mix of detection and sanctions, firms will for that
reason alone have an incentive to take steps to reduce legal risk. This is especially
so in a legal regime, like that of the United States, that uses respondeat superior as
the standard for corporate criminal liability, whereby the corporation is liable for
any crime or misbehavior by any agent acting within the scope of authority and at
least partially to benefit the firm. Because there is no good faith or reasonable
efforts excuse, the firm bears substantial liability risk, and has an incentive to
reduce it.22 The public benefits from precautionary investments in legal compli-
ance that minimize the net social costs of law violations committed by agents of
the corporation. A socially optimal compliance program, then, can be defined as
21. See generally Scott Highhouse et al., An Organization Impression Management Perspective on the
Formation of Corporate Reputations, 35 J. MGMT. 1481 (2009) (surveying literature on impression management
in corporations).
22. See O’Sullivan, supra note 6. On the other hand, strict liability may lead in the opposite direction, where
companies fear that their preventive efforts will uncover wrongdoing that creates liability that otherwise would
not have been uncovered. There are multiple consequences to such a rule, some perverse. See generally Jennifer
Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEG. STUDIES 833 (1994)
(diminished incentive to discover illegality). Outside of criminal law, respondeat superior may not aptly describe
the liability standard for corporations for acts of their agents. Nonetheless there is usually ample room for
derivative corporate liability, so we can ignore these legal distinctions in our discussion of culture.
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what “a rational, profit-maximizing firm would establish if it faced an expected
sanction equal to the social cost of the violation.”23 For any given firm, we will
describe this optimal, compliance-inducing expected sanction as point “A.”
However, the amalgam of corporate liability risks actually faced by a firm at any
given time is less than A, perhaps considerably so. There are many reasons: limited
regulatory resources, detection difficulties, legal uncertainties and procedural
obstacles, conflicts of interest, political pressure, etc.24 To use a good example of
great relevance to contemporary compliance, Jonathan Karpoff and colleagues
recently estimated the average sanction of a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
anti-bribery violation as nine times too low at current rates of detection compared
to the expected gains.25 Enforcement is at best cyclical, moreover, and periods of
severe under-enforcement (usually during boom times) can produce “compliance
rot.”26 Let’s posit that a firm would rationally assess its actual liability exposure at
the moment in light of these limitations as point “B.”
If B is less than A, then there will presumably be too much corporate
misbehavior and insufficient investment in compliance.27 While the most direct
response is to raise the liability exposure (hence moving B closer to A), that may
not be feasible. Inducing more compliance effort through either incentives or
positive legal command then becomes an attractive second-best alternative. The
goal is to incentivize or force a control system inside the firm that has the practical
effect of reducing wrongdoing that otherwise would have a positive expected
value.28
Our definition of B places it at the optimal point for the firm’s risk-return
calculus, as opposed to society’s optimal precaution point. But where managers’
actual beliefs are about wrongdoing and compliance—which we’ll label point
“C”—varies. At an exemplary complier, C will be closer to A. At more venal firms,
C will be on the wrong side of B, further away from A. Many forms of corporate
wrongdoing are committed by managers in their own selfish interest, not the firm’s.
23. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in JENNIFER ARLEN, ED.,
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING (forthcoming, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2533661, at 21. As Miller points out, there are multiple combinations of
detection probabilities and sanction levels that can be employed in search of this ideal point, which will affect
corporate behavior differently depending on risk aversion, etc.
24. On political constraints, see Daniel Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POLICY REV. 265,
273–74 (2015).
25. Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Value of Foreign Bribery to Bribe Paying Firms, http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1573222 (June 16, 2015), p.29; see also John Connor & Robert Lande, Cartels as
Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427 (2012).
26. See ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 2, 10–11 (2013) (describing cyclical
periods of “compliance rot” during economic booms).
27. To be sure, there are efficiency benefits from compliance as well. See generally Robert C. Bird & Stephen
Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance into Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming, 2017).
28. See Miller, supra note 23. On the larger effort to internalize compliance responsibilities by forcing
post-detection corporate cooperation with prosecutors, see Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure within the Firm,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1613 (2007).
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The CEO and senior management team may have short-term incentives and
materialistic ambitions. A crime might pay off for them now, but be sanctioned
only later, if at all. Although individual sanctions of various sorts are possible—
and not trivial—there is no reason to assume that the expected payoff from
wrongdoing is the same for the managers as opposed to the company. These are
agency cost problems, which corporate governance may not be strong enough to
solve.29
The distinctions among A, B, and C may seem self-evident, but they are not. In
the decades since compliance became a field of practice, it has been viewed mainly
in terms of agency costs and fiduciary responsibilities—how to get managers to
avoid selfish (disloyal) or ignorant (careless) behaviors that pose an unacceptable
risk of liability for the firm and its shareholders.30 That is, how to get to B, but not
necessarily any further. As a result, best practices reflect that corporate self-
protective strategy, which is testable by whether the steps would add to or subtract
from the value of the firm. By contrast, while the government does have an interest
in reducing agency costs to the extent they produce more corporate crime, merely
getting from C to B is not the main goal of its push regarding compliance. It
requires leaving the zone (and metrics) of private corporate governance in the
direction of A, thereby accepting public-regarding responsibilities.31
The common structural framework for compliance includes (1) a commitment
from senior leadership to the task, setting a right “tone at the top;”32 (2) delegation
of authority to officials with distinct compliance responsibilities and the resources
to do their task; (3) firm-wide education and training about both the substance and
process of compliance; (4) informational mechanisms to alert as to suspicious
activity (e.g., whistleblowing procedures); (5) audit and surveillance tactics to
detect compliance failures or risks; and (6) internal investigation, response,
discipline and remediation so as to learn and adjust when failures occur.33 The
right mix of these is firm-specific, a customization that recognizes the great range
29. How much corporate wrongdoing is disloyal and how much is meant to help the firm is debatable. My
impression is that most wrongdoing has both elements intertwined, which complicates the compliance function
considerably. In addition, agency costs no doubt drive some unwillingness to demand high-quality compliance for
fear of the personal liability for those at the top that comes from being made aware of the risk of wrongdoing (i.e.,
the desire for “plausible deniability”).
30. That assumes the orthodoxy of shareholder primacy, which is actually quite contestable. Indeed, the debate
over getting to point A encompasses many of the challenges to the shareholder wealth maximization model. See
the discussion infra at notes 155–57.
31. See Griffith, supra note 2, at 2124.
32. This is via formal codes of conduct or statements of principles, and by modelling of those behaviors in
senior executives’ day-to-day behaviors.
33. Practice-oriented treatises on compliance, with thorough discussions of these features, include JEFFREY
KAPLAN & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2015
ed.) and JED S. RAKOFF & JONATHAN SACK, FEDERAL CORPORATE SENTENCING: COMPLIANCE AND MEDIATION (2016
ed.).
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of motives, opportunities, and types of violations most likely to be a problem at a
given firm.
When faced with a heightened de facto or de jure compliance requirement, a
rational corporation will revise its risk estimate and respond accordingly. Happily
for society, an additional investment in compliance should have the desired effect
of raising the level of compliance without the direct expenditure of additional
public resources, because the company pays directly, not the government. This
outsourcing of costs is part of the policy allure of mandatory compliance.34 But we
can’t really count on net improvement because we still don’t know enough about
what works, and at what aggregate of direct and indirect costs. Recall the
compliance officer’s lament with which we began. Marginal value is hard to
measure, and these steps can be very burdensome. Enforcers are not constrained by
cost-benefit mandates or much else in the way of formal accountability that would
discipline their demands.35 What they choose might work, but we have little in the
way of evidence to instill confidence. Instead, we might just be getting costly
symbolism.
This ambiguity is crucial to all that follows. A, B, and C were presented as if
they were concrete and knowable reference points, but that is surely not true. Each
is imaginary and socially constructed. The lens through which this social construc-
tion occurs inside any given firm is a mix of individual cognition and corporate
culture, bringing us to the topic at hand.
B. The Road to Culture
As we saw, the genesis for a compliance obligation in criminal law starts with
respondeat superior or something closely akin to it, so that a corporation faces
liability for unlawful managerial or employee behavior. This is not just the threat
of criminal prosecution—firms faced a wide array of civil sanctions and collateral
consequences as well, under a host of different federal and state mandates. As the
administrative state grew, so did the need for prevention. In some fields (like
securities regulation), statutes or rules impose duties to monitor or supervise,
thereby making compliance an affirmative legal obligation.36 Episodic corporate
scandals in the last half of the last century made the need for compliance more
salient, and lawmakers reacted accordingly.37
The growing pressure to upgrade corporate compliance programs was famously
boosted by two developments in the 1990s. The more important, no doubt, was the
adoption of the federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG), under which
34. See Miller, supra note 23, at 17–18.
35. See Griffith, supra note 2, at 2118–20.
36. See Fanto, supra note 11, at 1132–43 (describing the supervisory mechanisms for broker-dealers and
investment advisers required under the securities laws).
37. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1821–28
(2007) (describing benefits and costs in Congressional response mandating greater internal controls).
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the amount of a corporation’s criminal fine would vary based on a variety of
factors, including the quality of its compliance program.38 Failure to have state of
the art compliance, then, became a distinct legal risk factor. The other was the
Delaware Chancery Court’s Caremark decision,39 which held that a board of
directors’ fiduciary duty of care included compliance oversight and monitoring not
limited to reacting to problems staring the board in the face.40 This decision is
often given credit for hastening the move to more intensive compliance programs,
though it was perhaps hobbled by its ultimate holding that only a “sustained and
systematic indifference” to compliance would actually generate liability for
individual board members.41
Most accounts of this development in the law agree that all this prompted more
attention to compliance inside corporations. The commentary of the time, how-
ever, remained skeptical about quality.42 Caremark’s “just do something” message
invited a check-the-box mentality, and it was unclear that the OSGs insisted on
much more than a paper program (or at least that judges had the capacity or
motivation to distinguish between state of the art paper programs and high-quality
ones).43 To use Kim Krawiec’s description, the standard compliance system might
still largely be cosmetic, just to satisfy minimum standards and get sanction credit
if needed.44 This is troubling, obviously, because if credit is given simply for paper
compliance, the deterrence calculus is skewed in the wrong direction. It is possible
that these academics were being too harsh, and that real progress was being made
toward better compliance. Practitioners seemed to think so,45 though perhaps
moved by the recognition that this was becoming a lucrative practice area. But the
data to know for sure one way or the other was lacking.
At roughly this same time, academic research drawing from social psychology
and organizational behavior exploded in volume and visibility, producing a
38. While no doubt having a powerful impact on corporate behavior, whether the OSG have achieved their
original purpose is controversial. See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 321 (2012).
39. In re Caremark Int’l Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). In such cases, plaintiffs would claim that
the board of directors failed to prevent some violation of law for which the company suffered large criminal or
civil penalties and other harms. For doubts about law-enforced compliance obligations within corporate
governance, see Stephen Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 974 (2006).
40. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
41. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. The standard is one of bad faith, which is not an easy thing for plaintiffs to
show; Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369, 370, 372 (Del. 2006).
42. See, e.g., William Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting and the Paradox of Compliance, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1343, 1343, 1415–17, 1420 (1999) (raising questions about the soundness of the emerging approach to
compliance).
43. Id. at 1343, 1415, 1420.
44. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U.L.Q.
487, 487, 489–90 (2003).
45. See generally Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Criminal and Civil
Responsibility: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559 (1990) (presenting overview of
both costs and benefits of enhanced compliance).
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growing stream of evidence-based inferences of the sort that had theretofore been
lacking about “what works and what hurts” in compliance.46 It came with a
substantive message: prominent researchers in the field were insistent that without
a values or ethics base to crowd out excess legalism in compliance, compliance
programs would predictably fall short.47 By the end of the last century, the role of
culture in compliance had gained solid academic acceptance.
The parade of corporate wrongdoing then became all the more garish. The
bursting of the technology bubble in 2000 and the spate of financial accounting
scandals exposed in its wake—Enron and WorldCom most notoriously, though
hardly alone—offered dramatic evidence of sustained corporate misbehavior.48
So, once again, there were reforms to push harder in the direction of better
compliance, most notably in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 for publicly-traded
corporations. The new public company responsibilities included having systems of
internal control over both financial reporting and disclosure generally that were
well-designed, tested, and audited.49 Given the close connection between disclo-
sure obligations and the risk of illegality,50 these reforms added to the compliance
pressures. In turn, “tone at the top” and other invocations of ethical culture by
regulators were becoming more common.51 A key step here occurred in 2004,
when the OSG were amended to make attention to ethics and culture an explicit
compliance goal (firms are expected to “promote an organizational culture that
encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law”52). By
this time, more and more companies now had a Chief Ethics and Compliance
Officer (CECO), separate and apart from their Chief Legal Officer.53 Much more
could be (and has been) said about this recent history, the details of which I leave to
46. See Linda Klebe Trevin˜o et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts?, 41
CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 146 (1999).
47. Lynn S. Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., March–April 1994, at 1–2, 8–9.
For early legal discussions following up on the suggestions of values-based proponents, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 71; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941 (2007); John
Hasnas, Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting Demands of Law and Ethics, 39 LOY. CHI. L.J. 507
(2008).
48. See Ronald R. Sims & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron Ethics (Or Culture Matters More Than Codes), 45 J.
BUS. ETHICS 243, 253 (2003).
49. See Langevoort, supra note 37, at 1826–28.
50. See Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe:” Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure and
Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763 (2016).
51. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir. of Enf’t, SEC, Tone at the Top: Getting it Right, Speech at the Second Annual
General Counsel Roundtable (Dec. 3, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120304smc.htm.
52. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)–(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004). The OSG
Advisory Committee, which set this process of accounting for culture in motion, cautioned against putting too
much emphasis on judging culture. See David Hess, Ethical Infrastructure and Evidence-based Corporate
Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from Empirical Evidence, 12 NYU J. L. & BUS. 317,
335–36 (2016).
53. See, e.g., DeStefano, supra note 13.
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others.54
Recent events have yet again put compliance in a bad light. The global financial
crisis that began in 2007 raised new doubts about corporate respect for law,
especially in the financial sector.55 The crisis was barely over when came the
LIBOR rate-rigging scandal56 and J.P. Morgan’s London Whale fiasco.57 More
recently, Wells Fargo found itself in trouble when pressure to meet sales quotas led
to the opening of thousands of unauthorized customer accounts.58 From outside of
financial services, there was General Motors concealment of ignition switch
problems59 and Volkswagen’s emission testing fraud, with the latter showing that
disdain for compliance was not a uniquely American phenomenon.60 Perhaps there
really was something in corporate water-fountains to inspire malice and blind
corporate agents to common ethical decency.61
By this time, regulators and enforcers were willing to take culture head on, so
that culture expanded from an academic obsession to a regulatory one. References
to culture appeared more and more frequently in official speeches and testimony.
At first this was probably just hortatory, intended for political consumption. To an
extent, it probably still is. When aimed at a company without a good one, it’s a
form of name-calling on behalf of an angry public. But in the last few years the
interest has seemingly become more concrete. The DOJ now explicitly invokes
culture in its guidance about prosecutorial discretion.62 The SEC and banking
agencies have explicitly taken on culture as well, for both enforcement and
regulatory supervision.63 The major self-regulator for broker-dealer firms, FINRA,
made culture of compliance a specific topic of inquiry in its 2016 examination
program for all broker-dealers, essentially requiring that they have a plan for
54. See Hess, supra note 52, for a good recounting of the recent history.
55. See CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS ch. 3 (2015).
56. See Alan D. Morrison & Joel Shapiro, Governance and Culture in the Banking Sector (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2731357.
57. See Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1629 (2014);
Jill Fisch, The Mess at Morgan: Risks, Incentives and Shareholder Empowerment, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 651 (2015).
58. See In re Wells Fargo, Inc., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 8, 2016).
59. See Marianne Jennings & Lawrence J. Trautman, Ethical Culture and Legal Liability: The GM Switch
Crisis and Lessons in Governance, 22 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 187 (2016).
60. See Josephine S. Nelson, The Criminal Bug: Volkswagen’s Middle Management (April 19, 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2767255.
61. E.g., Muel Kaptein, Understanding Unethical Behavior by Unraveling Ethical Culture, 64 HUM. REL. 853
(2011).
62. See, e.g., Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Criminal Div., Remarks at the 22nd Annual
SIFMA Ethics and Compliance Conference (Oct. 1 2014) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-assistant-
attorney-general-criminal-division-leslie-r-caldwell-22nd-annual-ethics.
63. In banking, see Alberto Musalem, Executive Vice President, N.Y. Federal Reserve Board, Why Focus on
Culture? (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/mus151123; Baxter, supra
note 13; Anjan Thakor, Corporate Culture in Banking, 22 ECON. POL’Y REV. 5 (2016). At the SEC, see
Commissioner Luis Aguilar, Doing the Right Thing: Compliance that Works for Investors (Apr. 18, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515784.
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addressing firm-wide ethical issues.64 Culture of compliance now has an identity
of its own, which begs to be taken seriously.
II. UNDERSTANDING CULTURES OF COMPLIANCE AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Culture of compliance refers to the shared beliefs—“sense-making”65—inside
any given organization about the importance or legitimacy of legal compliance
vis-a`-vis other pressures and goals. It is highly normative. This is in contrast to
places where the word is used more loosely—for instance, it’s common to hear that
a new boss came in and “changed the culture” in his or her sphere of authority. If
all the boss did was to threaten wholesale firings, behavior may have changed in a
way that involved raw fear, but without altering the prevailing belief system.
Cultural change may follow or not, and if it does, not necessarily for the better.
Cultures based on intimidation are not a particularly good route to either honesty
or accountability. (The same point might be made about firms threatened with
prosecution or civil enforcement).
Culture becomes especially important, then, when—as is often the case—the
structural aspects of compliance and supervision cannot or do not otherwise
influence behavior. Particularly in terms of human resources and technology,
control structures are costly and intrusive in many different ways. As a result, firms
are limited in how much they are willing to spend in extending their reach, even if
they might be beneficial. So, hiding places remain in most corporations.66 Culture
is what managers and other employees take for granted even when acting in the
dark, outside the monitors’ line of sight.
An ideal culture of compliance would be one that accepts public responsibility
to lessen the net social costs of its activities—the harms from legal wrongdoing—
even if a private calculus of likely consequences suggests that there is money to be
made by cautious cheating. Using the typology set out in the previous section, in
other words, a healthy culture of compliance legitimizes (rather than denigrates)
the effort to move C past B and closer to A. What regulators are saying in
emphasizing culture is that the credit a company gets depends not only on the
structural elements of compliance best practices, but also how willingly and well
64. Letter, FINRA, Establishing, Communicating and Implementing Cultural Values (Feb. 2016), http://www.
finra.org/industry/establishing-communicating-and-implementing-cultural-values.
65. See generally KARL WEICK, SENSE MAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS (1995). The study of organizational culture
generally is a massive scholarly field still working through the numerous interdisciplinary challenges of defining
culture, discovering its antecedents, and assessing its consequences. See Charles A. O’Reilly et al., The Promise
and Problems of Organizational Culture: CEO Personality, Culture and Firm Performance, 39 GROUP & ORG.
MGT. 595 (2014). The long-standing methodological rift between sociologists who focus on culture and
psychologists who focus on individual cognition has hardly been resolved, notwithstanding much effort at
reconciliation.
66. See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 451, 460–70
(2003) (describing obstacles to deep knowledge of all that goes on affecting compliance).
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“it” commits to a greater level of precaution and law-abidingness than is crudely
rational from a cost-benefit perspective.
As we are about to see, a fair number of anthropologists, sociologists, and social
psychologists believe that this idealistic sounding effort to instill a responsible,
pro-social corporate culture is possible and worthwhile, if not easy. By contrast,
orthodox economists’ heads practically explode at the thought. Behaviors matter,
not beliefs. If B is optimal, there is no reason to seek A, and marketplace discipline
of various sorts threatens those misguided enough to try. Businesses are inclined to
aggression and risk-taking in the name of survival and profit, normalizing within
the internal belief system what outsiders might view as unethical opportunism, i.e.,
“self-interest seeking with guile.”67 These economists would characterize the
effort to instill a pro-social corporate culture as hopelessly naı¨ve, maybe even
illegitimate. And if everything is coldly calculative, the only solution is to change
the calculus in favor of more enforcement and greater sanctions, not prattle on
about ethics and social responsibility.
The next portion of this Article will travel across this methodological and
normative quicksand to try to answer some important questions about instilling
cultures of compliance. But first, we have to set forth the hopeful case for building
pro-social corporate cultures.
A. Pro-Sociality
Outside of orthodox economics there is a strong belief that human and
organizational motivations are complicated, with the capacity to be better than the
“homo economicus” prediction of relentless self-interest indicates.68 In these
accounts, shrewd calculation gives way to the power of identity and beliefs—
including the pull of pro-social behavior like cooperation and loyalty—that vary in
intensity and direction but can be harnessed for the good. There are ethical cultures
and climates and unethical ones.69 We just need more of the former.
As Lynn Stout and other legal scholars have argued with respect to corporations
and other economic settings,70 there is substantial evidence in the social sciences
67. This famous phrase from Oliver Williamson is often used to describe the methodological assumption that
natural human behavior is both self-serving and clever. See Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunism and its Critics, 14
MANAG. & DECISION ECON. 97 (1993).
68. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 94–118 (2011).
69. For a good literature review with extensive citations, see Linda Klebe Trevin˜o et al., (Un)Ethical Behavior
in Organizations, 65 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 635 (2014). Brian Galle has found evidence of substantial compliant
behavior among certain non-profit private foundations without much of any threat of enforcement. Corporate
Compliance without Enforcement? Private Foundations and the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional
Funds Act, May 3, 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2807631.
70. See generally Stout, supra note 68 (exploring this theme at length). For other law-related invocations of
this idea, see sources cited infra note 75.
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(and natural sciences) of strong moral impulses.71 One of the important findings of
psychological research in behavioral ethics, for example, is that the incidence of
cheating in experimental settings is noticeably lower than it could be even in
situations where there is little or no likelihood of detection, and that certain
pro-social interventions can nudge subjects toward good behavior without material
incentive. Out of this hopefulness has come a genuine enthusiasm among many
behavioral types that well-designed “values-based” ethics and compliance pro-
grams can succeed, with careful nurturing.
Recently in this journal, for example, Gary Weaver (a leading organizational
behaviorist) drew a helpful map for what a values-based approach should seek to
do, and offered evidence to show that it works better than a command-focused
approach.72 He stresses strong ethical leadership at the top (and among supervisors
throughout the firm) so that leaders:
“(a) are trustworthy; (b) are fair and balanced in decisions; (c) set ethical
examples in the workplace; (d) conduct their personal lives in an ethical
manner; (e) listen to employees; (f) discipline employees who violate
ethical standards; (g) keep employees’ best interests in mind; (h) initiate
discussion of ethics with employees; (i) openly incorporate ethical consider-
ations into decision making; and (j) assess success not just in terms of results
but according to how those results were obtained.”73
In an adjacent contribution, Tom Tyler added to this list an emphasis on the power
and inherent legitimacy of both organizational and legal commands in motivating
compliant behavior without threats or force.74
There is now a lively and sophisticated literature by academics and a few
practicing lawyers promoting this kind of values-based, anti-command and control
mission.75 Building on the inclination toward pro-social behavior, they say, firms
should make a deep commitment to both law and ethics, and work hard to sustain
that commitment against conflicts of interest and other temptations.76 They urge
71. These insights are rapidly being bolstered by research in cognitive neuroscience. See Diana C. Robertson
et al., Business Ethics: The Promise of Neuroscience, J. BUS. ETHICS (forthcoming 2017).
72. Gary R. Weaver, Encouraging Ethics in Organizations: A Review of Some Key Research Findings, 51 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 293, 296–97 (2014).
73. Id. at 309 (citing Michael E. Brown et al., Ethical Leadership: A Social Learning Perspective for Construct
Development and Testing, 97 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 117, 117–19 (2005)).
74. Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 267, 267 (2014).
Tyler is one of the country’s most prominent social psychologists and a pioneer in promoting equity-based
workplace behaviors as key to good organizational conduct.
75. E.g., Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture and Ethics in Financial
Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191 (2013); Hess, supra note 52; Fanto, supra note 11; Stucke, supra note 11.
From a practice perspective, see Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance
through Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 961 (2012). EthicalSystems.org is an
organization headed by prominent social psychologist Jonathan Haidt to promote research on corporate ethics and
behaviorally-informed interventions therein. See http://www.ethicalsystems.org/.
76. Id.
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companies to commit to a compliance program not limited to simple law-
abidingness but to doing the right thing as a matter of Aristotelian habit formation
and sustainable corporate identity.77 Boards and senior managers have to become
evangelists for virtue, and persistently both model and communicate the impor-
tance of that commitment against internal and outside pressures to the contrary.
B. Assessing the Claims
The foregoing case for optimism about the possibility of corporate cultural
change has a solid academic pedigree. But it reads as something of a half-truth,
because there is a darker set of findings that comes out of the same behavioral
ethics and other contemporary social sciences research. More pessimistically, this
work makes a case for the presence of pervasively rationalized self-interest in
corporate culture, rather than natural goodness waiting to be unlocked. This darker
scholarly account has roots in the white collar crime literature in sociology, which
has long been interested in the pathologies of business organizations.78 Relatively
more recent is a growing body of experimental psychological research on ethics,
plus work connecting individual and group cognitions to organizational cultures.
The bottom line in behavioral ethics is that there may be less cheating and
opportunism than there could be (as noted above), but still much more than there
should be. The challenge is to explain how and why.
This is not a reversion to assumptions of neoclassical economics by any means,
even though some of the implications may point in the same direction. Indeed,
much of contemporary economics now relaxes the rationality and self-interest
assumptions, willing to acknowledge that human motivations are complex, often
pro-social and cooperative, and highly cultural. Beliefs matter, as do identities.79
There is ample empirical evidence that strong corporate cultures can add economic
value, and are recognized as valuable assets by firm leaders.80 But self-interest
hides, not disappears, and internal loyalty and bonding can palpably increase the
level of aggression directed at outsiders (e.g., customers, competitors), even as it
greases internal trust and cohesion.81 Cultural and situational pressures cause bad
behavior even among good people.
77. Id.
78. A classic study in this genre is ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS
(1983).
79. See George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 9
(2005).
80. John R. Graham et al., Corporate Culture: Evidence from the Field, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2805602 (July 7, 2016); Luigi Guiso et al., The Value of Corporate Culture, 117 J.
FIN. ECON. 60, 61 (2015).
81. E.g., John Hildreth et al., Blind Loyalty? When Group Loyalty Makes Us See Evil or Engage in It, 132 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 16, 16–17 (2016); Ori Weisel & Saul Shalvi, The Collaborative Roots of
Corruption, 112 Proceedings of the Nat’l Acad. Sci. 10651 (2015). On how individual and cultural impulses
connect, see Jesse Kluver et al., Behavioral Ethics for Homo Economicus, Homo Heuristicus, and Homo Duplex,
123 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION. PROCESSES 150, 152–53 (2014).
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While laboratory experiments are the source of much of this new learning, some
of the most helpful research on corporate culture seeks out correlations in large
data sets between observable executive personality or cultural traits and firm-wide
outcomes. The Ashley Madison study is an example of such work by a team of
financial economists, seeing if there is a link between the tendency to cheat in an
executive’s personal life and outcomes both good and bad: innovation on one
hand, fraud liability on the other.82 Other recent papers in this genre find positive
correlations between personal managerial shortcomings regarding substance abuse,
domestic violence, etc. and firm-level financial improprieties,83 and between one
form of misconduct (options backdating) and the likelihood of other unrelated
compliance violations.84 They find that character and culture both matter. They
also stress that the antecedents of wrongdoing spread like viruses from firm to firm,
via geographic connections and social networks.85 Corporate cultures are never
entirely insular.
This empirical interest in firm-level wrongdoing is important. The rational actor
model held primacy for so long in the business context, even in the face of
psychology research suggesting that people actually think and behave quite
differently, largely because corporate managers seemed to have such strong
incentives to be smart rather than fall prey to heuristics and biases. In a competitive
selection process, the smart should be rewarded. Smart and unbiased (or rational)
were thus assumed to be synonymous. Yet the financial economics research was
showing that variable managerial traits, personalities, beliefs and the like had
persistent effects even in the most successful firms. Psychology matters. That
prompted behavioral economists to take on the question of whether there might not
be adaptive biases: beliefs and cultures that are not entirely realistic, but promote
successful economic behavior nonetheless.
Today, the best-known examples of adaptive biases in economics and psychol-
ogy have to do with optimism and overconfidence.86 They start from the observa-
tion that in a highly uncertain environment, anxiety is natural. But both personally
and organizationally, anxiety is problematic—distracting and potentially demoral-
izing. So it would follow that a moderately unrealistic level of optimism and
82. See Greiser, supra note 17.
83. Robert H. Davidson et al., Executives “Off-the-Job” Behavior, Corporate Culture and Financial Reporting
Risk, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 10 (2015). Another study found that a greater incidence of unrelated regulatory
violations (an indicator of a weak compliance culture) was also associated with financial misreporting. Simi
Kedia, et al., Culture of Weak Compliance and Financial Reporting Risk, http://www.ivey.uwo.ca/cmsmedia/
2077220/01-29-kedia.pdf.
84. See Lee Biggerstaff et al., Suspect CEOs, Unethical Culture, and Corporate Misbehavior, 117 J. FIN.
ECON. 98, 118 (2015).
85. See Christopher Parsons et al., The Geography of Financial Misconduct, http://www.nber.org/papers/
w20347.pdf.
86. I have written about this for some time. See LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 16, at 26–27, 38–40;
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 139–43 (1997).
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overconfidence might reduce anxiety and lead to greater effort and persistence,
among other things. If this is right, we might predict that leaders would be chosen
for such traits, and in turn would try to instill comparable beliefs in the company
culture. Today, as a result of research in organizational behavior, social psychol-
ogy, and financial economics, significant evidence suggests that this is so.87
In turn, these biases matter to corporate governance and compliance.88 If
executives are overconfident, for instance, they are likely to take more risks (and
be rewarded, on average, for so doing89). All the more so, it would seem, if their
excessively positive beliefs are viral and internalized company-wide.90 This
risk-taking could relate to law, especially where the law is somewhat ambiguous.
Where the law calls for an assessment of the situation—whether in tort law’s
approach to negligence, or securities law’s requirement that management analyze
accurately the risks and uncertainties it currently faces—such managers and their
firms may well fail to calibrate the way the law would want. The cure, if there is
one (and it is deemed acceptable) is corporate governance at the top, compliance
all the way down. And governance and compliance people would have to be
behaviorally adept for the cure to work.
Over-optimism and overconfidence, however, are just two biases that may have
survival power within firms. There are many more. If culture matters as much as
researchers suggest, such adaptive beliefs and routines extend beyond any one
person, becoming the grease that makes competitive firms particularly high-
performing, instilling a positive sense of power and identity.91 In the face of such a
machine, ethics and compliance have their work cut out. This grease in the
machine is what ethics and compliance programs have to worry about.
III. CULTURAL RESISTANCE
A. Self-Serving Biases at Work
To repeat: a capsule summary of contemporary research on behavioral ethics is
that in the face of temptations to cheat, most human beings cheat less than they
could, but more than they should. That is to say, orthodox economists are wrong to
say that people generally just maximize self-interest by trading off the risks and
benefits of opportunism. Conscience and a deep-seated desire for a positive
87. E.g., David Hirshleifer et al., Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?, 67 J. FIN. 1457, 1494–95
(2012).
88. See Suman Banerjee et al., Restraining Overconfident CEOs via Corporate Governance: Evidence from
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 28 REV. FIN. STUDIES 2812 (2015).
89. See Anand Goel & Anjan Thakor, Overconfidence, CEO Selection and Corporate Governance, 63 J. FIN.
2737, 2339 (2008).
90. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 83 (suggesting how CEO-level behaviors are retransmitted throughout the
firm).
91. See Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box of Corporate Culture in Law and Economics, 162
J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 80, 82–86 (2006).
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identity and a good reputation really are powerful. On the other hand, opportunism
seems to be commonplace when people can rationalize self-interest so as to create
consistency between the opportunism and a good self-image. The question—
crucial for behaviorally-adept compliance—is what conditions nudge people (or
organizations) in one direction or the other.92
Keep in mind that self-interest plays out in two overlapping ways. The first
involves wrongdoing by a corporate agent that is personally self-serving (e.g., to
get a bonus, or to avoid being fired) and potentially a violation of the firm’s
policies and expectations. Insider trading is a good example of behavior for which
the employer faces only a small risk of secondary liability because of the entirely
self-serving nature of the act; as a result, regulators have to demand that employers
where there is a particularly high risk of insider trading (broker-dealers and
investment advisers) adopt policies and procedures to generate compliance. Some
cultures bolster this sort of selfishness,93 pushing point C in our schema in the
wrong direction, far away from A and even B.
The other category is where the manager or employee seeks to benefit the firm
by his or her unlawful actions.94 A bribe to get additional business is an example.
Here, the legal risk to the firm goes up, but so presumably do the benefits of
engaging in the wrongdoing and not getting caught, or getting caught but let off
relatively easily. (Recall the suboptimal sanctions under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act). In calculative terms, then, this kind of managerial or employee
behavior is more complicated and interesting. Especially after the financial crisis, a
common observation is that occasional sanctions were simply a cost of doing
business and treated as such regardless of the size and presence of an in-house
compliance team. The watchdogs bark but don’t bite, unless the wrongdoing falls
largely into our first category or some scapegoat is needed. Both of these forms of
opportunistic law-breaking are relevant to compliance, but the second may
actually be the more pernicious in terms of organizational culture because the
behavior—though legally risky—is an expression of group loyalty.95
There are moral instincts, including the desire in most to be and be seen as a
“good” person. At the same time, selfish instincts—presumably also related to
survival in evolutionary terms—operate unconsciously but with considerable
cognitive effect. Advances in neuroscience shed new light on the contest between
the “wants” operating automatically in the brain, and the “shoulds” that happen via
a slower, more deliberative effort.96 The result is a constant struggle for most
92. For a good overview of behavioral ethics, see Max H. Bazerman & Francesca Gino, Behavioral Ethics:
Toward a Deeper Understanding of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85 (2012).
93. See Biggerstaff, supra note 84.
94. Of course, personal benefit often follows from actions taken to benefit the firm. In all likelihood, separating
the loyal from the selfish is impossible, since loyalty is often rewarded.
95. See Hildreth et al., supra note 81, at 16–17.
96. See Kluver et al., supra note 81, at 154 (describing the hormonal influences on group loyalty). For a review
of the neuroscience literature as it pertains to business ethics, see Robertson et al., supra note 71.
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people, with wants having the upper hand because they process faster. Experimen-
tal evidence, for example, suggests that people will often cheat, but stop before the
cheating is so egregious that they would have to see themselves as cheaters.97
Short of that, they rationalize, normalize, and avoid so as to maintain cognitive
consistency between the actions (self-serving) and their preferred identity (a good
person).98 For better or worse, the mind is adept at facilitating the hypocrisy.
Although there is much at work here, and very much still not well understood,
there is a sizeable body of research, experimental and in the field, supporting the
strong tendency toward “motivated reasoning” (or selective perception), which
quite simply is the tendency to interpret what we see the way we want to see it,
ignoring or dismissing disconfirming evidence.99 This can occur completely out of
consciousness, or via more familiar forms of rationalization. It is easiest—with the
most “wiggle-room”100—when the cues are somewhat ambiguous.101
This is a vast subject, the subject recently of numerous well-publicized books by
the psychologists doing this kind of work.102 Legal scholars in a variety of fields
have put these findings to use, including how they relate to compliance, so there is
no need to treat the subject at length here.103 The power of motivated reasoning can
be strong, and ample field research indicates that it operates as powerfully, if not
more, in settings dominated by sophisticated actors—law, medicine, finance,
etc.104 Presumably, it has many of the same survival attributes as overconfidence
or over-optimism, maintaining focus and persistence, overcoming risk aversion.
The effect is clear enough: pursuit of self-interest becomes all the easier, without
any threat to positive identity. Ethical lines fade or blur.
This fading is bolstered by a cluster of cognitive traits that operates similarly,
under the heading of competitive arousal. Competition and rivalry have a number
of motivating effects, leading to greater aggressiveness and risk-taking. Overconfi-
dence is part of this cluster. Unfortunately, that kind of hormone-driven arousal
also leads to a higher rate of noncompliance and unethical behavior, whether
97. This is a main theme in Dan Ariely’s work. See DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY
(2012).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Francesca Gino et al., Motivated Bayesians: Feeling Moral While Acting Egoistically, 30 J.
ECON. PERSP. 189, 191–93 (2016).
100. See generally Jason Dana et al., Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Experiments Demonstrating an Illusory
Preference for Fairness, 33 ECON. THEORY 67 (2007).
101. For a thorough discussion, see Yuval Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law and Economics,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 213, 230 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman,
eds., 2014).
102. E.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011); ARIELY, supra note 97.
103. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Ethics, Behavioral Compliance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING (Jennifer Arlen ed., forthcoming); Killingsworth, infra note 117;
Regan, supra note 47; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957 (2006) (relating this to risk
regulation by lawyers and others).
104. In addition to the citations in notes 96 and 97, see LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 16, at 27–28.
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directed against the rival or some third-party.105
There is also what goes under the heading of loss aversion or (usefully, I think)
“hypermotivation.”106 Aggressive risk-taking comes most strongly when the
person or group faces what they perceive as a risk of loss, as opposed simply to the
possibility of gain.107 The mind is highly possessive—it fights particularly hard to
keep what it sees as rightfully belonging to it, even if the sense of possession is
aspiration or expectation.108 As the two researchers who coined the term put it, “a
wide range of evidence suggests that people who find themselves ‘in a hole’ and
believe that dishonest behavior is the only apparent means of escape are more
likely to cheat, steal and lie”109—without necessarily acknowledging to them-
selves that what they are doing is wrong. In business settings, there are many
competitive threats that project a strong loss frame.110
These are all descriptions of individual cognitions, not cultures. At the organiza-
tional level, however, we would expect to see these same biases strengthened and
compounded unless there is some potent intervention to check them (i.e. gover-
nance or compliance111). Groups are more powerful than any one person, with
their own claims to loyalty and identity.112 Confidence, motivated inference, and
other biases become all the more adaptive when mutually reinforced.113
And that is compliance’s problem. The next section will turn to particular forms
of self-serving inference about the law. For now, see how unlikely it is that
communications and training about ethics will survive the filtration process
imposed by deeply functional beliefs that rationalize and facilitate aggression and
risk-taking in competitive settings. To return for a moment to the individual focus,
work in behavioral ethics studies experimental settings where the incidence of
cheating rises or falls. It falls under some conditions, including prompting the
conscious realization that what the subject is facing is a moral choice. So far, so
good. The conditions under which the incidence of cheating rises, on the other
hand, under many conditions that are highly descriptive of business settings.
105. E.g., Mina Cikara et al., Their Pain Gives us Pleasure: How Intergroup Dynamics Shape Empathic
Failures and Counter-Empathic Responses, 55 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 110 (2014); Jason Pierce et al., From Glue
to Gasoline: How Competition Turns Perspective Takers Unethical, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1986 (2013).
106. Scott Rick & George Loewenstein, Hypermotivation, 45 J. MKTG. RES. 645 (2008).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 645.
110. See Greve et al., supra note 16, at 64–67 (competitive strain as a source of corporate misconduct).
111. See generally Banerjee, supra note 88 (describing governance mechanisms to counter overconfidence).
112. See Alain Cohn et al., Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry, 516 NATURE 86 (2014)
(priming self-concept as banker leaders to more unethical decisions); Julian Conrads, Lying and Team Incentives,
34 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 1, 2–3 (2013); Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 79.
113. See generally Langevoort, Black Box, supra note 91, at 85. A strand of the literature on corporate culture
speaks in evolutionary terms: cultures that facilitate corporate survival. See J. Richard Harrison & Glenn Carroll,
Organizational Demography and Culture: Insights from a Formal Model and Simulation, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 511
(1998).
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Competitive arousal is one, stress and “depletion” others.114 Visible trappings of
wealth make cheating more likely,115 as do competitive reward systems: one
research paper speaks of “goals gone wild.”116
In other words, business settings that are perceived as highly competitive are
riddled with prompts that facilitate unconscious cultural resistance to the implica-
tions of any strong emphasis on ethics and compliance. After all, the goal of
compliance and ethics is to teach people to leave money on the table where an
opportunity comes with enough moral or legal risk. The compliance instinct is to
err on the side of caution. But that runs counter to what is often hard-wired into the
organization psyche, upsetting the norms and customs on which many successful
businesses think they depend.117
The trade-offs are visible enough. Overconfidence, for example, is associated
with greater compliance risks but also associated with greater internal motivation
and more innovation.118 It may be a leadership trait. A team of behavioral
researchers who focus on financial reporting recently posed the question well: if
you could administer shots to senior executives that make them less optimistic—or
less focused and intense—would you?119 It would probably help in terms of
compliance and ethics, but might also put organizational success at risk. Recall the
Ashley Madison finding that the inclination to cheat is positively associated with
firm-level creativity and innovation.120 Tweak the belief system and the conse-
quences are unpredictable. Fear of the unknown begets anxiety; anxiety triggers
resistance.
None of this is a good reason for the government (or the public) not to insist on
dampening interventions. Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is designed largely to do
just that for public companies, through a series of speed bumps in the form of
stronger audit committees, more extensive internal controls, and the like.121 What
is more doubtful is the power of the intrinsic—self-regulated—approach to
compliance. The behavioral research would predict that most officers and directors
114. David T. Welsh & Lisa D. Ordo´n˜ez, The Dark Side of Consecutive High Performance Goals: Linking
Goal Setting, Depletion, and Unethical Behavior, 123 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 79
(2014).
115. See Miryam Kouchaki et al., Seeing Green: Mere Exposure to Money Triggers a Business Decision
Frame and Unethical Outcomes, 121 ORGANIZATIONAL. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 53 (2013).
116. Lisa Ordo´n˜ez et al., Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of Overprescribing Goal Setting, 23
ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 6 (2009).
117. See generally Langevoort, Behavioral Ethics, supra note 103; Scott Killingsworth, “C” is for Crucible:
Behavioral Ethics, Culture and the Board’s Role in C-Suite Compliance (May 29, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2271840. Antitrust compliance is particularly interesting in that it addresses
wrongdoing that diminishes competition, a fairly direct response to feeling an excess of competitive pressure.
118. See sources cited supra note 83.
119. Gregory Capps et al., Natural Optimism in Financial Reporting: A State of Mind, 30 ACCT. HORIZONS 79
(2016).
120. See Greiser, supra note 17.
121. Langevoort, Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 36, at 1828–33.
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would sincerely intend to promote legal caution and good ethics, but that the good
intentions would be at risk both at the executive level and in the process of cultural
translation and diffusion throughout the organizational hierarchy.
All this should not be overstated—corruption is not the norm, and there is
considerable force to pro-social impulses. Remember that the rationalization and
normalization predicted by the behavioral ethics research is usually within limits.
Individuals don’t tend to cheat brazenly, not only because of the chance of
detection but also because that threatens self-image.122 Presumably, similar
restraint exists in the organizational culture, too. Organizational corruption hap-
pens, of course, as so many scandals have shown.123 But corruption is usually a
lengthy slide down a slippery slope,124 as small transgressions grow larger and
larger without being checked early enough either by external sanction or internal
governance. There is a cultural dimension to this, as the eminent psychologist John
Darley has written,125 as grosser rationalizations fuel the growing willingness to
transgress. By that point, any culture of compliance has been thoroughly defeated.
Compliance has better odds when addressing the small steps before the devolution,
even if considerable cultural resistance is already in place.
B. Then Why the Optimism?
So a closer reading of the behavioral research on cognition and culture suggests
that pro-sociality is not necessarily the natural state in business organizations, and
any effort to instill such faces formidable resistance. For example, the bulk of the
research on conflicts of interest indicates that conflicts tend to be resolved
cognitively (and organizationally) in favor of self-interest. Max Bazerman and
colleagues have written extensively about the psychology behind auditors’ willing-
ness to abet client misrepresentations, and come to the pessimistic conclusion that
independence is cognitively impossible. They advocate strong regulatory (not
values-based or self-regulatory) solutions.126
So are the optimists missing something, or being naı¨ve? I suspect neither; the
proponents are first-rate academics who often do acknowledge at some point that
the route to exemplary ethics faces these obstacles, just not with the same
122. See supra notes 97–98.
123. The Enron scandal, in particular, stimulated much inquiry into the underlying organizational behavior.
See, e.g., Sims & Brinkmann, supra note 48, and sources infra notes 153–54.
124. See Catherine M. Schrand & Sarah L.C. Zechman, Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to
Financial Misreporting, 15 J. ACCT & ECON. 311, 313 (2012) (presenting evidence of innocent, overconfident first
steps that eventually lead to violations of law).
125. John Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption, 70 BROOK.
L. REV. 1177, 1185–87 (2005) (process of “entrapment”); see also Blake E. Ashford & Vikas Anand, The
Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, 25 RES. IN ORG. BEHAV. 1 (2003).
126. E.g., Don Moore et al., Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction and
Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 10 (2006); see also Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein,
Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUSTICE RES. 189 (2004).
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emphasis. Weaver, for example, spends the large bulk of his attention on building
pro-social attitudes in corporate settings, but at the end expresses concerns about
the automaticity of self-interest and leaves the balance between these opposing
forces as an open research question.127 Read carefully, they are more making the
point that values-based interventions are necessary than that they are sufficient.128
Two things are likely going on in the relative optimism with which compliance
is promoted, including the values-based framework. First, there is an element (no
surprise) of motivation. Compliance has become important, and experts are in
demand. That requires a constructive, positive agenda, because no one pays much
just to hear academic doom-saying. Therefore, the positive gets accentuated. This
is amplified by the growing cadre of compliance consultants and lawyers who
specialize in improving compliance. Their business model, too, has to be founded
on some display of boosterism about what works in compliance, not what makes it
hard. That much is understandable.
The other takes up a point made earlier. There is very little doubt that some (or
much) of research in behavioral ethics is ideologically value-laden. The right-
leaning tilt of Chicago-school economics sees its opposite in behavioral ap-
proaches in the social sciences.129 My sense is that many who do this work
acknowledge being deeply troubled by corporate social irresponsibility, workplace
inequity, arrogance and greed, and plainly want to change it. (I put myself in that
category, by the way.) If so, there is a felt need to accentuate the promise of ethical
salvation by good works—to stress what works—and not given in to some
Calvinist acceptance of the inevitably of corporate sin. We will soon see, however,
what happens inside the firm when the ethic and compliance effort comes to be
viewed in the corporate culture as the work of missionaries trying to save sinners.
IV. RESISTANCE SCRIPTS
The aim thus far has been to portray compliance as a struggle between
pro-sociality and self-interest, which plays out in both individual cognition and
behavior and corporate culture. The outcome of this struggle varies from firm to
firm and is highly situational. Some cultural traits (e.g., a strong social orientation,
or in some settings a more conservative political ideology) may push in the
direction of more law-abidingness rather than less. But my general impression
leans toward pessimism: selection biases, and the grease of normalization and
rationalization, can too easily flourish in the conditions present in so many
businesses. This is especially so where those inside the organization feel a sense of
hyper-competition, i.e., a survival threat. What pro-social ethics and law-
127. Weaver, supra note 72, at 314–15. Legal scholars and practitioners understand this, too. E.g., Fanto, supra
note 11, at 1166 & n. 148; Killingsworth, supra note 117.
128. E.g., Weaver, supra note 72.
129. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS: A CRITIQUE (2002).
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abidingness are then up against is daunting. The culture enables beliefs that either
suppress the perception of inappropriate ethical and legal behavior in the first
place, so that it is not recognized as a problem at all, or justify the behavior to
buffer against burdens of guilt and anxiety. As we saw in the last Section, these
subtle forces allow people and firms to maintain a positive self-image and identity
while competing effectively, even viciously. A regulator, enforcer, or internal
compliance officer will observe people and groups who seem quite sincere in their
intentions to do the right thing, even when they don’t.
The opaque visibility (if not invisibility) of culture is a challenge. But sociolo-
gists and anthropologists who study cultures have long pointed out the visible
markers of culture—myths, totems, ceremonies—that offer a glimpse into the
substance and power of prevailing beliefs. Increasingly, they pay attention to these
markers in contemporary business organizations.130 Those interested in compli-
ance should, too. The kind of normalization and rationalization that greases the
internal corporate machinery often emerges in the form of schemas and scripts—
well-learned and oft-repeated narratives that bolster the legitimacy of what is
believed and how business is done.131 Initiatives to promote better compliance,
whether from the inside or the outside, have to recognize them. This Section
considers a number of common scripts via which the corporate culture deflects
legal and ethical demands, thereby impeding the hoped-for journey away from B
by blurring, if not denigrating, A.
A. Legal Construal
In an important series of articles, alone and with a variety of co-authors,
sociologist Lauren Edelman has taken a deep look at how businesses internalize
beliefs about the meaning of legal demands, particularly equal employment
opportunity requirements.132 Regulators send messages about what the law ex-
pects and requires, say, in terms of human resources decisions regarding hiring,
promotion and termination. Professional groups within the firm—those charged
with these responsibilities—interpret those expectations and requirement in ways
that may distort the original message, so that what is internalized is different.133
130. A useful description for a legal audience is Greg Urban, Corporations in the Flow of Culture, 39 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 321 (2016). Appropriate to our interest here, Urban notes how permeable corporate cultures are—and
have to be—to the influences of the larger social culture.
131. See Dennis A. Gioia & Peter Poole, Scripts in Organizational Behavior, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 449 (1984).
132. E.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Law,
97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992). A more recent study of interpretation and construal of legal requirement in financial
services is Sharon Gilad, How Firms Translate Regulatory Messages, LSE Discussion Paper No. 70 (March
2012), http://www.lse.ac.uk/accounting/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper70.pdf.
133. In turn, such organizational construals feedback into the process of law-making. See Lauren B. Edelman
& Shauhin Talesh, To Comply or Not to Comply—That Isn’t the Question: How Organizations Construct the
Meaning of Compliance, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 103 (Christine Parker
& Vibkek Nielson, eds. 2009) (showing how the law came to reflect internal corporate practices).
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Self-interest plays an important role here, though not a simple one. One of
Edelman’s important discoveries was that some human resources specialists
become change agents, advocating for greater attentiveness to new legal de-
mands.134 Some of this draws from the larger social culture—equal opportunity,
for example, deserves respect. This would be an example of pro-sociality at work
(moving B closer to A in employment law compliance). But she also notes what
economists would call intra-firm rent-seeking behavior: those who are charged
with interpreting and applying the law covet more power, influence, and resources
vis-a`-vis others in the firm, and wrapping one’s function in the cloak of legal
requirement and social expectation is a good way to negotiate.135 The consequence
of new legal demands, often enough, is to empower those who claim the ability to
interpret and apply them.
A separate body of research in cognitive psychology adds to this story. Yuval
Feldman and various colleagues have, in a variety of experiments and commentar-
ies, observed that the otherwise strong power of the law-abidingness norm
diminishes considerably when the law is ambiguous.136 This is very similar to
work in behavioral ethics regarding “moral wiggle-room:”137 the automaticity of
self-interest when the mind can find a way to maintain consistency between the
desired self-image as a good person and what is wanted. Legal ambiguity, in other
words, enables self-serving scripts that are more easily believed. And as all
lawyers know, legal ambiguity is commonplace in regulation.
As Edelman’s work stresses, however, self-interest can play out in a number of
different ways, bringing us back to the distinction between points B and C.
Intra-firm rent-seeking is manifest in C, which we’ve so far portrayed as regres-
sive. But as she shows, it needn’t be: some firm employees’ self-interest may be
consistent with more legal compliance, not less.
This echoes a long-standing question of interest, to me and to many others: are
corporate lawyers cognitively (and culturally) inclined toward their own self-
interest or toward the interests of their clients? If the former, we might well predict
that attorney self-interest is risk-averse, because the blame lawyers receive if they
bless an action later determined to be unlawful is far greater than what they suffer
from just saying no to a client. And indeed, that is a stereotype—lawyer as
134. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Employers’ Handling of Discrimination Complaints: The Transformation
of Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497 (1993); see also Frank Dobbin, et al., Equal Opportunity
Law and the Construction of Internal Labor Markets, 99 AM. J. SOC. 396 (1993).
135. See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV.
SOC. 479, 499–500 (1997).
136. See generally Yuval Feldman & Henry E. Smith, Behavioral Equity, 170 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON.
137 (2014); Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
980, 995–97 (2009); Yuval Feldman, Self-Interest and the Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis
of the Rule Versus Standard Dilemma, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 81 (2008); Feldman, supra note 101. On the impact of
such biases, see Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving
Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997).
137. See Dana, supra note 100.
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nay-sayer. Excessive legal caution in the face of ambiguity is a way to getting to A,
albeit a costly one for the firm and its shareholders.138
For a variety of reasons, however, lawyer self-interest and client self-interest are
more likely to converge in cognition and corporate culture, so that in-house
lawyers, especially, are not particularly reliable enthusiasts for the socially optimal
compliance point, even as they pay close attention to legal commands. The
interested reader can find much more on this elsewhere,139 but I would stress two
reasons in particular. First, firm leaders (CEOs in particular) have come to
understand the costs of nay-saying, and have worked hard to recruit in-house
lawyers (and indeed outside lawyers as well) who are especially attuned to
business needs. Promotion tournaments inside the company reinforce this, encour-
aging and rewarding risk-takers, especially when—as is almost always the
case—the law is systematically under-enforced.140 Recent work in financial
economics demonstrates that chief legal officers tend toward client interest (or
managerial self-interest) when compensated like managers, i.e., with a bundle of
incentive payments.141
The other reason is epistemological. Lawyers usually have only an indirect view
of the myriad facts and circumstances faced by corporate managers and employees
on the ground. On most all routine matters, they have to rely on second-hand (or
even more remote) assessments of legally crucial inputs like risk, reward, and
reasonableness. The more cognitively dependent the lawyer is on in-house
personnel, the more likely those inferences are to be biased. When lawyers have
successfully been acculturated into the firm, those inferences come easily. (So, too,
with compliance personnel, if not walled-off.)
Consider this example from financial services. On matters relating to the
suitability and adequacy of risk disclosure in the sale of complicated financial
products to customers, informed consent is something of the norm. In most
circumstances, neither lawyers nor compliance personnel become intimately
involved in the sales interaction, though the latter will certainly see the results
within the surveillance system. Has there been informed consent? My sense is that
salespeople are cognitively and culturally motivated to see the answer is yes, and
in normal circumstances, legal staff will usually leave those fact-specific infer-
138. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in
Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY. L.J. 375 (1997).
139. See Sung Hui Kim, Inside Lawyers: Friends or Gatekeepers?, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1867, 1870 (2016);
see also Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-house Lawyers, Enterprise Risk and the Financial
Crisis, 2012 WISC. L. REV. 495; Regan, supra note 103.
140. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable, supra note 139, at 504–05.
141. See Adair Morse et al., Executive Lawyers: Gatekeepers or Totems of Governance?, J. L. & ECON.
(forthcoming 2017). As to outside counsel, consider the evidence that certain illicit accounting practices spread
via law firm connections. See Patricia Dechow & Samuel Tan, How Do Accounting Practices Spread? An
Examination of Law Firm Networks and Stock Option Backdating (Feb. 23, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id2688434.
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ences alone unless and until there is push-back. For a host of practical reasons that
were alluded to earlier, push-back is rare. Yet there is a great deal of ambiguity in
the law about informed consent, especially with respect to vulnerable investors
(e.g., senior citizens) or especially complex products.142 Whatever messages might
be sent about dealing fairly with customers, sales forces can develop strong—and
motivated—inclinations to believe that disclosure works, so that otherwise fairly
aggressive sales tactics are deemed legitimate and lawful.143 So can their lawyers.
We have to be careful here, because there is not necessarily any obligation to
interpret truly ambiguous laws against self-interest. This is where the line between
law and ethics becomes especially important, and motivated inference affects both.
Even as to law, my point is that there may well be an inclination to see more
ambiguity than there really is, and an inclination to use that internally as leverage
for opportunism. Something has to explain why there are so many fines and
penalties imposed on firms that had so many lawyers at their disposal but took the
risks anyway.
B. Legitimacy
The pro-social claim for embracing a culture of compliance strongly depends on
the belief that law-abidingness is a virtue, rejecting the Holmesian “bad man”
approach of a simple risk-return calculus to obeying the law or not.144 In other
words, most people accept the legitimacy of law and want to conform to it, in letter
and spirit. And indeed, there is plenty of social science evidence that rates of legal
compliance are, generally, higher than what that calculus would predict.145 But the
social science claim is dependent on whether the law is viewed as legitimate, and
to what extent. Cognition and culture generate answers, which once again may (or
may not) be motivated and self-serving. The more cynical about any particular
legal mandate a person or group becomes, the less powerful the law’s expressive
force. Narratives about white collar over-criminalization and prosecutorial over-
142. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1041–54 (7th ed. 2013).
143. See LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 16, at 133–37. In fact, disclosure will sometimes increase
opportunism. See George Loewenstein et al., The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and Potential of Disclosing
Conflicts of Interest, 101 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers and Proceedings) 423 (2011). On the disheartening willingness
of some firms in the securities industry to hire financial advisers with questionable disciplinary histories, see Mark
Egan et al., The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
2739170 (2016). On the impact of a sales culture on compliance, see Arthur B. Laby, Regulatory Convergence
and Organizational Culture, 90 TULANE L. REV. 1181 (2016).
144. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Internal Point of View in Law and Ethics: Introduction, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1143, 1143–44 (2006) (describing Holmes’ contribution). Holmes is famous for posing the question of
obeying the law as a rational calculation of costs and benefits.
145. This is an important theme in the work of social psychologist Tom Tyler. See Tyler, supra note 74, at
268–71. Legitimacy and social license are important in sociological accounts of legal compliance as well. E.g.,
Jodi Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the
Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361 (2010).
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reach feed the de-legitimation.146
And so a culture that pushes back against the law in subtle (or not so subtle)
ways offers a convenient—and very greasy—script for denigrating A. The story-
lines come easily, too. We live in a world in which the legislative process is tainted,
so that often enough, as public choice theorists predict, law is put up for sale. A
company slammed with new regulations can easily construe them as their more
powerful competitors’ handwork, thus draining the law of all its legitimacy. Other
popular tropes with the same effect are to see regulators run amok, mindlessly
imposing burdens, or—especially in a highly polarized political environment—
law as the product of anti-business partisanship. (It is worth noting, for instance,
that firms with a Republican orientation are somewhat more likely to be accused
of violating labor and civil rights law147). When these scripts work, B—not
A—claims the mantle of legitimacy.148
A classic study in the management literature shows how these kinds of
inferences can hobble compliance even when top management wants the compli-
ance.149 A financial services company was selling insurance policies on commis-
sion, which runs the legal risk that sales agents will “churn” policies—causing
households to cancel their existing policy for a new one, just to get another
commission. Senior management became aware from regulators that heightened
enforcement was likely, and so imposed a new compliance policy: all “substituted”
policies within 90 days of cancellation had to be reviewed and specially approved.
The sales agents, however, read their own meaning into the message, convinced
that management wasn’t serious: after all, there had been churning going on
previously, for which the salespeople had gotten bonuses and other rewards from
the bosses. They construed the message as cosmetic only, encouraging them to do
the obvious—churn, but always on the 91st day after cancellation. By the time the
law’s message reached the field, in other words, it had been hopelessly distorted.
146. Haugh stresses how easily the rationalizations familiar from the study of white collar crime get put to use
in organizations. See Haugh, supra note 11, at 24 (citing William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001)). He points out that this process is not fanciful—there may well be criminal
excess. Probably so, but our account gives ample reason to suspect that corporate cultures amplify the perception
in self-serving ways. This denigration extends beyond any particular law in question, to generalized commitments
to law-abidingness. See Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1399 (2005).
147. See Irena Hutton et al., Political Values, Culture and Corporate Litigation, 61 MGMT. SCI. 2905 (2015).
Democratic-leaning firms are more likely to be accused of securities fraud and intellectual property infringement.
Id. On the complicated effects of ideology in taxation, see Bill B. Francis et al., CEO Political Preference and
Corporate Tax Sheltering (2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2762223&download
yes.
148. On the variability in how key personnel inside firms interpret regulators and their demands—as threats,
allies, or obstacles—see Garry Gray & Susan Silbey, Governing Inside the Corporation: Interpreting Regulation
and Compliance, 120 AM. J. SOC. 96 (2014).
149. Tammy L. MacLean & Michael Benham, The Dangers of Decoupling: The Relationship Between
Compliance Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions, and Institutionalized Misconduct, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1499
(2010).
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The firm was caught, and penalized heavily because the rate of churning had gone
up after the warning, not down.
Perhaps the most familiar scripts to denigrate legal requirements display a
different kind of cynicism. One of the most common forms of excuse-making is
that “everybody does it,” which is all at once a perception that comparable
behavior is a competitive necessity and in fact socially tolerable, no matter what
the law says. Psychologists point out that, often enough, that this rationalization is
imagined—“naı¨ve cynicism”—rather than based in thorough observation.150 If so,
its main function is to enable aggression (which can, in turn, become a self-
fulfilling prophecy as others react to the evidence of more such behavior). The
same can be said for other ways of justifying the rejection of normative com-
mands: that the victim would have acted the same way toward us if given the
chance, or that it’s all just part of “the game.” Researchers have long pointed to the
common invocation of sports and military imagery and use of euphemisms in
business settings, which provide cover for the kind of competitive arousal that tests
legal and ethical boundaries.151
C. Celebratory Scripts
Scripts that effectively denigrate legal compliance make it easier for other
corporate values to ascend. From the Ashley Madison example, recall that
behavioral ethics research has identified creativity as a precursor to ethical
line-crossing, presumably because creative people are more adept at excuse-
making, to themselves and others. Yet creativity is highly valued everywhere in
business—imagine telling Disney that they should put a lid on creativity in the
name of a better culture of compliance. One can easily name other traits that are
seen in the business world as exemplars—passion, focus, intensity, drive, the
desire to think outside the box—that are also quite capable of inducing moral blind
spots. On a more mundane level, denigration of law strengthens in comparison
simple values like loyalty and community—employees of the firm and their
families have a better shot at surviving and thriving in the face of intense
competition. To those who feel strongly part of the corporate group (the pull of
“groupishness”152), that is a particularly powerful motivator. The possibilities here
are endless; the point is simply how easily law’s normative force can be diluted by
the self-serving myths conjured up by motivated reasoning.
The Enron scandal of the early 2000s, for example, was abetted by these kinds
of perceptions: that the firm was “inventing” a new form of energy management
150. See Tyler, supra note 74, at 278 (citing Dale Miller & Rebecca Ratner, The Disparity Between Actual and
Assumed Power of Self-Interest, 74 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53 (1998)).
151. See, e.g., ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 145–46 (1988); see
also Freek Vermeulen, Stop Comparing Management to Sports, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2, 2016), https://hbr.org/
2016/06/stop-comparing-management-to-sports.
152. Kluver, supra note 81.
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for the world, requiring that it unshackle itself from old style of energy regulation
and the kind of financial accounting characteristic of an earlier industrial era.153 By
reframing the legitimacy of the rules, Enron executives made themselves into the
innovators, while rule abiders and enforcers were holding the world back from a
better future. Elsewhere, I have described how the market worship culture in
investment banking set the stage for the financial crisis.154
To many sociologists and some legal academics we should add to the top of this
list of possibilities (with Enron as the poster child) the norm of shareholder
value-maximization.155 Indeed, there is a long-standing debate in corporate law
about whether officers and directors have a fiduciary duty to embrace B and
nothing more. While the legal answer is almost certainly no, the idea that
executives have a high calling to generate shareholder wealth surely serves as a
convenient rationalization for profit-making behavior absent a compelling legal
instruction to the contrary. There is a growing body of evidence that publicly-
owned firms face greater compliance challenges than private ones, including
maintaining healthy cultures.156 Given law’s ambiguity, under-enforcement and
(often enough) denigration, shareholder value-maximization—myth or otherwise—
presents a particularly noble-sounding script for the pursuit of whatever interests
are served by the autonomous exercise of business judgment.157
D. The (Il)legitimacy of Compliance
In an important and instructive recent survey of corporate compliance officers,
Linda Trevin˜o and colleagues found that compliance programs face their own
problems of legitimacy in business organizations.158 They note the perception of
resistance, and the reluctance of managers outside of compliance to cede to the
specialists expertise in the kinds of ethical values presumably instilled long ago in
church and school. Their findings are consistent with the point we have been
stressing: the myriad of ways in both cognition and culture that competitive values
crowd out compliance values.
153. See generally MALCOLM S. SALTER, INNOVATION CORRUPTED: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACIES OF ENRON’S
COLLAPSE (2008); LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 16, at 37–42.
154. See Andrew Lo, The Gordon Gekko Effect: The Role of Culture in the Financial Industry, 22 ECON. POL’Y
REV. 17 (2016); HILL & PAINTER, supra note 54 at 116–17; Morrison & Shapiro, supra note 56; See generally
LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 16 ch. 6.
155. See generally Salter, supra note 153.
156. See generally Guiso et al., supra note 80.
157. My own sense is that shareholder value is symbolically useful to senior corporate executives, but not
necessarily viewed as strongly legitimate, as illustrated by how much managers denigrate the pressures of
short-termism generated by investors and the marketplace. See LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 16, at
105–07.
158. See generally Linda Klebe Trevin˜o et al., Legitimating the Legitimate: A Grounded Theory Study of
Legitimacy Work Among Ethics and Compliance Officers, 123 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 186
(2014).
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This work poses the question of how others in the organization “see” (and
interpret) the growth of compliance demands. Presumably, the answer again varies
from firm to firm, and context to context. But I suspect that the forms of
denigration described above are at work, and can become corrosive. For example,
the style of internal compliance can mimic the behaviors of prosecutors, triggering
impressions of overreach and excess.159 As the technology of surveillance im-
proves (no doubt fostered by public sector innovations in the name of national
security and anti-terrorism160), Big Brother images easily come to mind.161 There
are also concerns about who is promoting compliance and why. This takes us back
to our points A and B. A is socially optimal, but not achieved via law enforcement
alone. B is economically optimal, at least in a short-term sense. But as we have
stressed, A is also unknown—there is no consensus about the measure of harms
corporations cause beyond that for which they are actually held responsible.
The desire to make corporations more socially responsible is long-standing,
especially on matters relating to labor rights, consumer protection and environmen-
tal responsibility. It has always been a left-leaning political and intellectual project,
subject to frustration as the political power of corporations increased over the last
century. (To social responsibility proponents, the troubling shortfall in enforce-
ment reflects the raw exercise of that power.) While that project persists in the
U.S., and even more so in Europe,162 contemporary moves toward more socially
responsible corporations have focused especially on three goals associated with
the desire for greater “publicness” in powerful institutions (corporate and
otherwise):163 more transparency via disclosure; increased accountability in
decision-making processes; and greater voice in those processes for affected
persons. These usually take the form of governance reform, rather than substantive
requirements.
The compliance movement fits neatly into the publicness story.164 It is meant to
empower a set of persons within the organization (compliance officials) whose
roles are to lean against the profit-seeking pressures emanating from senior
managers, shareholders and the capital markets. The turn to culture in compliance
is a demand for respect for the effort, to make the journey to point A one for the
entire firm. And many of the key components of modern compliance theory echo
159. See generally Haugh, supra note 11.
160. See LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 16, at 97–98.
161. See Patricia Sanchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First
Century Employee, 40 AM. BUS. L. REV. 63 (2012). For an excellent exploration of the tension in financial services
(including cultural ones) resulting from the rapid deployment of surveillance technology, see Oonig Dom-
balagian, Preserving Human Agency in Automated Compliance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COMM. L. 71 (2016).
162. See generally Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion of the
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2005).
163. See LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 16, at 27–29; Sale, supra note 57.
164. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern
Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 872 (2011) (“a compliance officer is a cop, a private
sector cop pursuing a public goal”).
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the social responsibility and publicness campaigns. We’ve already noticed the
stress on the fair treatment of employees in the academic work on behavioral
ethics; more broadly, there is the unmistakable inference that a company that
becomes more socially responsible will be more compliant, as well. The goals
merge.
This is not the place to debate whether governmentally induced workplace
equity, social responsibility and publicness are good ideas or not.165 My far more
limited point is that to the extent those inside the corporation are motivated to see
things in the adaptive, self-serving way we’ve described, they are also inclined to
doubt the legitimacy of this movement. The scripts here are predictable, and not
entirely wrong. Compliance standards are the product of informal government
action as much or more than disciplined legislation or rule-making. Authority is in
the hands of regulators and enforcement lawyers whose incentives (and whose
own scripts) lean decidedly in the direction of legal risk-aversion and control.
Companies that have to bear the costs without visible benefits will suspect that the
demands are an excessive burden, and to the extent they represent an incursion on
efficiency and innovation, an illegitimate burden. Even when senior managers
espouse strong compliance, those below may sense that they’re being forced to do
so by the government, against their better judgment (recall the life insurance sales
story). In sum, the legitimacy challenges Trevin˜o and her colleagues found are
quite deeply rooted.
V. USEABLE LESSONS ABOUT COMPLIANCE
The last two Sections discussed cultural norms that distort or deflect strong
compliance messages, especially aspirational ones. The point is not that such
resistance always dominates inside a firm. Firms are presumably scattered along a
bell-curve continuum running from admirably high compliers to woefully low
ones. But resistance is always a worry, and has to be understood and countered best
as possible by those carrying out compliance responsibilities. Such is the on-going
struggle of compliance. Skirmishing never stops.
Merely to identify the struggle, however, is a typical academic move: interest-
ing, perhaps, but not terribly useful. So what is there more constructive to say or
do? Most importantly, what best produces the conditions for a culture of compli-
ance to succeed, as it sometimes surely does? Answers to these questions are the
payoffs to our journey through the social science research, important both to those
who work at preventive compliance and to law-makers who enforce compliance.
To begin, three points of general applicability. First, compliance is dynamic, not
static. Personalities and cultures interact with situational pressures in ways that are
165. There is a body of research tying social responsibility to positive firm outcomes, including in compliance.
See generally Harrison Hong & Inessa Liscovich, Crime, Punishment, and the Halo Effect of Corporate Social
Responsibility (May 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21215.
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ever changing. It becomes easy to assume that because all is well, all will continue
to be well, but that is a familiar psychological trap. One of the big challenges in all
aspects of compliance is to develop mental and technological models where
problems can appear suddenly and grow out of what seems to be nothing.166 How
well the firm is doing varies over time.
Second, as we saw early on, the impetus for making compliance a responsibility
is because the law does not effectively force corporations to bear the full social
cost of the unlawful behavior. A bona fide culture of compliance seeks to minimize
those costs anyway, even though it might be wealth maximizing to do less (A
instead of B). This is significant, because compliance is frequently portrayed by
compliance people as an effort to serve the best interests of the company and its
shareholders. To an extent, it is. This compliance as “good for business” message
becomes tempting, if for no reason other than to gain legitimacy in the eyes of
others inside the company. But as nearly everyone who has ever thought hard
about that message in the context of compliance, ethics, diversity or other public
values has concluded, that is a dangerous portrayal because it implicitly makes
corporate self-interest paramount.167 Styling messages in those terms invites
self-serving inference to fester, because often enough illegality is worth the risk
from a purely calculative perspective. One clear consequence of this is that
compliance and ethics must coalesce—pure legalism never gets past B.168 Simi-
larly, it is dangerous to paint compliance as an agency cost remedy. To be sure,
where agency costs are high and managers think mainly of themselves, compliance
weaknesses can become toxic and threaten the firm. It is crucial to good
compliance to get from C to B. But the effort is not meant to stop there: the goal of
the compliance mandate from the regulatory perspective is always A.
The third lesson is that few if any companies will ever get all the way to A.
Compliance norms threaten the beliefs, behaviors and cultural tropes that are
instinctively success-producing. These instincts may be myths: naively cynical
managers may well underestimate the benefits to the firm that come from
166. See Lo, supra note 154, at 36–37 (explaining computer-based dynamic predictions of compliance and
risk-taking). Largely outside the scope of this Article are the technological changes in the workplace itself (e.g.,
personal devices and networks) that can frustrate structural compliance initiatives by diverting behavior into less
observable spaces and speeding up the retransmission of beliefs and attitudes. These changes affect culture, too.
See John H. Walsh, Compliance in the Age of Connectivity, RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with
author).
167. See generally Paine, supra note 47. This conundrum affects not only compliance but other forms of social
responsibility, diversity, etc.—to see them as “good for business” cheapens their intrinsic moral content.
168. That much seems increasingly accepted in the business community, at least structurally. Separation of the
ethics and compliance function (the role of the CECO) from the legal function is now fairly commonplace, at least
partly because the act of representing the corporation calls for an aggressive attitude that may not best foster
ethical aspirations. See Trevin˜o et al., supra note 46, at 146; Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law
Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2006); Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable, supra note 139, at
500–02. Not everyone agrees. See DeStefano, supra note 13. One negative consequence of separation is that the
internal legal function is coded as outside of ethics and social responsibility.
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heightened compliance and social responsibility. But they are common myths, and
sticky ones. A well-intentioned CECO sensing resistance may well choose the
firm’s best interest as the prime directive in search of that elusive legitimacy,
fearing that a strong embrace of point A will simply fail and hoping that the
structural tools put to work in the name of protecting the corporation will catch or
deter a broader range of wrongdoing. It may well be that firms whose cultures fall
even half-way between A and B grade high on the effort scale, at least when the
grading is on a curve.
A. Lessons for Firms
1. Editing the Scripts
Merely communicating the desired goal of strict law-abidingness is never
enough. Good communication is essential, and has to be persistent, unambigu-
ously tied to the real choices managers make on a day-to-day basis.169 One of
behavioral ethics key insights is that ethical prompts that occur too early before a
choice have little impact—most people intend to do the right thing, until immedi-
ately faced with a dilemma.170 The messages have to be values-based, not
strategic, and not undermined by inconsistent behaviors and directives from the
senior management team. This much seems to be a given in the sophisticated
contemporary compliance manual, if not always followed faithfully in practice.171
More specifically, the resistance to a culture of compliance is often via scripts,
and so much of the compliance effort must be to rewrite them. To use our example
from earlier, if people in sales have come to place great faith in written disclosures
to customers—so that aggressive sales tactics are fair after disclosure—then
someone has to expose the illusion: disclosure does not dependably put customers
on guard, and can often enable opportunism.172 One of the key jobs for compliance
is to uncover the cultural language and impressions that facilitate risky thinking
and behavior.
As noted, denigration of law and law-makers (or enforcers) is another enabling
script. While there may be considerable realism in the perception that law-making
is a flawed enterprise, it may still help to bring to managers’ attention on an
ongoing basis the genuine challenges of regulation—the why behind rule-making
and enforcement, and the histories of abuses, in the hope that perceptions inside
the company can become a little less jaundiced. Compliance should be a voice for
why regulation is needed, and even helpful, for honest firms in a world filled with
too many lemons.
169. See generally Killingsworth, supra note 75; Regan, supra note 47.
170. See generally Ann E. Tenbrunsel et al., The Ethical Mirage: A Temporal Explanation as to Why We Aren’t
as Ethical as We Think We Are, 30 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 151 (2010).
171. See sources cited supra note 47.
172. See sources cited supra note 143.
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Self-protective scripts allow managers in the firm to think of themselves and
their groups as highly ethical and can lead to creative reinterpretation of behaviors
to the contrary in order to maintain consistency with that view. There is among
most all of us, sadly, some level of moral hypocrisy, but especially among the most
powerful.173 Such hypocrisy is hard to dislodge, but perhaps it may be made a bit
easier by getting managers to acknowledge first the dangerous power of rational-
ization in others. Case studies of conflicts of interest and other compliance
failures—inside the firm and elsewhere—can be portrayed in behavioral terms,
with the hope that dwelling on this long enough will cause the audience to see that
they could hardly be immune to those same self-blinding heuristics and biases. The
message is that smart people with the best of intentions threaten some of the
biggest harms to both their own moral identity and the corporate community.
The single most powerful compliance message—the best way to knit genuine
moral habit-formation with sustainable corporate interest—is to get managers and
employees to accept their own fallibility when taking legal and other risks. A
message of humility, in other words.
These are constructive lessons to convey to others, but there are also cautionary
ones for compliance people themselves to learn. It becomes very easy for
compliance officials to react to resistance and doubts about their legitimacy by
upping the power of the powerful tools they have at their disposal: surveillance and
monitoring. They start behaving more like cops on the beat. Although there surely
is a place for such intrusion, one of the key insights of research in both behavioral
economics and behavioral ethics is that monitoring intensity can backfire.174
Heavy monitoring can be a threatening sign of distrust, crowding out any residual
internal motivation on the part of the monitored to do the right thing because it is
right. Under certain circumstances, then, an increase in monitoring can actually
increase misbehavior, not decrease it. One of the culture-oriented tasks for
constructive compliance is explaining the presence of necessary tools in a way that
is less likely to provoke dangerous reactance or demoralization, and avoiding
excess.
2. Hiring and Promotion
One of the intractable problems in building a culture of compliance is that
certain traits that are, on average, negatively correlated with ethical responsibility
are positively correlated with competitive success. Competitiveness itself, plus
creativity, confidence, optimism, intensity, focus and dogged persistence all have
evil twins in terms of mental capacity and internal motivation to bend rules.
173. See generally Joris Lammers et al., Power Increases Hypocrisy: Moralizing in Reasoning, Immorality in
Behavior, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 737 (2010).
174. See generally Tyler, supra note 74; Langevoort, Monitoring, supra note 47, at 94–100.
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It is probably a losing proposition to suggest that corporations shy away from
people with those traits in favor of strict moral rectitude—competitive firms tend
not to recruit heavily from seminaries and schools of social work. Most human
resources experts put power and leadership traits on the top of the corporate wish
list. But the message to compliance is clear: to the extent that those traits are
especially prized and celebrated in the corporate culture, they can become
dangerous. Some script editing is due here, too.
Another given in values-based best practices is to assure that incentives inside
firms—especially those related to promotion and compensation—are consistent
with expressed ethical values.175 That is to say, if people are expected to reach and
surpass unreasonable goals, many will take it as license to cheat. If those with
stricter ethical values are passed over in promotion in favor of the more ethically
plastic, the cultural message will again be clear. What we’ve seen simply adds to
the importance of this. All it takes is a tendency (perhaps subconscious) to take
greater ethical or legal risks to become favored in a corporate promotion tourna-
ment supposedly based on merit.176 Even if the law is optimally enforced, in large
numbers of iterations there will be some lucky risk-takers who do not get caught,
and who will thus appear to be especially skilled and productive. If they are the
ones promoted, they become cultural exemplars and evangelists for their style of
flexibility (or competitive intensity, focus, etc.).177 But the law is rarely optimally
enforced, as we’ve seen—and sometimes horribly under-enforced178—so that the
odds then become even more stacked in their favor. The pathways to power have to
be another compliance watch-list item. (Though outside the scope of this Article,
the connections among hiring and promotion patterns, diversity—especially gen-
der diversity—and compliance deserve more attention than they get.179)
3. Fairness
One dominating message from the behavioral ethics literature is that perceived
fair treatment of managers and other employees is important to good behavior.180
Those who feel mistreated are more likely to cheat vis-a`-vis the firm, whether in
retaliation or simply because of a sense of moral license. Presumably the latter can
175. See Weaver, supra note 72, at 310; see also Laby, supra note 143, at 1192–98 (discusses incentives in
financial services sector).
176. See Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable, supra note 139, at 503–05.
177. See generally Killingsworth, C-Suite, supra note 117.
178. See generally sources cited supra notes 25–26.
179. See Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive Suite: Grease, Grit, and
the Corporate Tournament, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1615 (2004). There is substantial evidence that, on average,
women are more ethically responsible (and less prone to self-serving inference) than men. While the organiza-
tional dynamics here should not be oversimplified, there is probably a good case that greater gender diversity in
leadership positions will lead to better ethics and compliance. See LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 16, at
157–59.
180. See Trevin˜o & Weaver, supra note 16, at 267–92; Tom Tyler et al., The Ethical Commitment to
Compliance: Building a Values-Based Culture, 50 CAL. MGMT. REV. 31, 36–40 (2008).
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produce behaviors that harm third-parties (stakeholders) as well, as a way of
evening the score.181 Building a fair internal governance system seems self-
evidently a good idea, but equally self-evidently hard to pull off. Research
indicates that those who exercise power aggressively are persistently seen as
stronger leaders than those who seek reputations for being fair.182 Perceptions of
fairness, moreover, are notoriously subject to motivated reasoning—there are
strong egocentric biases to the construal of what is fair.183 Assignments of fault and
blame often generate intense denial and defensive bolstering,184 making them
seem unfair whether or not they would be so to an unbiased observer. And often
enough, the perception of unfairness is justified. Pressures from above can often
become unreasonable, prompting frustration, loss of control and an increased
ability to justify cheating. Imagine a setting where the CEO has put off a hard
choice until it becomes intractable, and then demands that a vice president solve it
anyway. That’s not fair, which can easily prompt irresponsible action in return with
little or no guilt. Whether the CEO had any appreciation that he or she set all this in
motion by lack of leadership (probably not) is unimportant.
These are daunting challenges, probably dooming any effort to establish
intrinsic fairness as the single most celebrated norm in the corporate culture. But
this is a place where the perfect may be the enemy of the good. Research shows
that “the most effective leaders are generally those who give employees a voice,
treat them with dignity and consistency, and base decisions on accurate and
complete information.”185 Notwithstanding how much behavioral researchers
stress them, fairness and its correlates remain under-appreciated, in their connec-
tion both to a healthy culture of compliance and to positive organizational change.
4. Metrics
Perhaps the “holy grail” question in culture of compliance studies is whether
there is a reliable mechanism for measuring the organizational climate with respect
to ethics and compliance. Compliance consultants and organizational researchers
have given much thought to the design of confidential survey tools that ask a broad
sample of managers or employees to answer a set of questions about how ethical
the organization is perceived to be, how often they feel pressure to cheat, and how
often they have observed misbehavior by others.186
181. See Daniel Houser et al., Fairness and Cheating, 56 EUR. ECON. REV. 1645, 1646 (2012).
182. Batia M. Wiesenfeld et al., Why Fair Bosses Fall Behind, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 26 (No. 7–8, 2011).
183. See Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretation of Fairness and Interpersonal
Conflict, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 176 (1992).
184. See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCH. BULL.
255, 257–58 (1999).
185. Wiesenfeld, supra note 182.
186. See John Cullen et al., The Ethical Climate Questionnaire: An Assessment of its Development and
Validity, 73 PSYCHOL. REPTS 667 (2008).
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It is not hard to critique these tools. Our story gives ample reason to believe that
individual employees develop the ability to deflect perceptions that threaten their
self-image, which likely operates on a group level as well. Survey answers, then,
may come mindlessly from available scripts, burying evidence of guilt for self and
others.187 Even more obviously, when the surveys are administered under the
authority of higher-ups, some managers and employees will give the answers they
think their superiors want to hear, not necessarily the truth. These critiques are
hardly damning, however. Even if there is some inflation bias built in, compliance
personnel might get useful comparative information. That is, discovering settings
where the responses are relatively more disturbing—or trend in a particular
direction—may be helpful compliance intelligence as to where the sharper tools of
compliance (audit, surveillance, etc.) are especially needed.
Whether compliance officials are motivated to conduct honest surveys is
another matter (and a good time to note that motivated biases and cultures affect
compliance personnel, too). Bad news in the field in terms of perceived ethicality
and law-abidingness casts a bad light on the compliance team’s own performance,
and is hardly the kind of news the upper echelon wants to hear, material though it
might be. And as others have pointed out, the possibility that bad findings might
find their way to regulators, plaintiffs’ lawyers, competitors or the media has to be
especially scary. That has long led some to call for a self-evaluation privilege for
compliance monitoring.188 But with such materiality to troubling findings, courts
and regulators are naturally reluctant to make such assurances. The bottom line in
all this is that some external pressure would probably be needed to prompt more
survey-taking, and that such pressure will at the same time decrease the incentive
for loyal employees to give candid answers. Indeed, the reasonable fear may be
just the opposite: that profit-oriented compliance consultants become adept at
generating impressive-looking surveys that are biased to give the rosy results that
the upper echelon would much rather have in its possession.
B. Lessons for Policymakers and Enforcers
1. Ex Post: Prosecution and Enforcement
As noted, there is now a sizable literature on the role of government enforcers—
mainly DOJ—in establishing compliance obligations and compliance monitoring
via deferred and non-prosecution agreements. Most of it is critical. The main
criticism is that prosecutors lack the expertise and incentives to create meaningful
reforms that reduce the risk of recidivism, thereby imposing unnecessary costs
or—if these terms are in lieu of some stronger sanction—diminishing deterrence.
187. Francesca Gino et al., See No Evil: When We Overlook Other Peoples’ Unethical Behavior, in SOCIAL
DECISION MAKING: SOCIAL DILEMMAS, SOCIAL VALUES, AND ETHICAL JUDGMENTS 241 (R. M. Kramer et al., eds.
2009).
188. See Joseph E. Murphy, The Self-Evaluative Privilege, 7 J. CORP. L. 489 (1982).
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After reforms are imposed, prosecutors lack the time, resources or desire to revisit
the firm to see whether the reforms made any difference. They have too much else
to do, and have moved on. The strong suggestion is that enforcers back away from
imposing compliance-related reforms.
The concerns about expertise and incentives cut in different ways. One, simply,
is that the reforms do more harm than good. Another is that enforcers naively
believe they are efficacious and thus demand less in more conventional kinds of
sanctions than they otherwise would, thereby achieving less in deterrence and
anti-recidivism.189
Those are serious concerns, but can easily be overstated. Some mandatory
reforms are not so obviously outside the competence of enforcers, especially when
we take into account that the biggest compliance problems usually reflect agency
cost infections when corporate governance has already failed.190 For example, it
may be entirely sensible to require an increase in the corporation’s compliance
budget for a multi-year period, new reporting lines and internal oversight, and/or
new officers or directors to replace irresponsible incumbents. Though some
targeted reforms might turn out to be wasteful, sticking to the compliance status
quo could just as easily perpetuate inadequacy. So, too, with forced personnel
changes at the officer-director level. For corporate shareholders, such are the
consequences of corporate wrongdoing.
A thorough discussion of these structural reform issues is beyond the scope of
this Article, however. The question for our purposes is what, if anything, culture
adds to this debate. As to whether prosecutors are particularly adept at deep
anthropological understanding of any given firm’s culture, the answer is surely not.
Enforcers usually think about compliance only after finding evidence of wrongdo-
ing, and bring their own set of cognitive and cultural biases, some perceptual,191
others motivated.192 Public enforcers are overly likely to see and attribute a bad
189. A third possibility is that these reforms are intentionally cosmetic, meant only for public consumption and
used as a bargaining chip in settling cases. See Krawiec, supra note 44.
190. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 12. An important open question is whether the trauma of government
prosecution itself will invigorate governance reforms to regain shareholder or stakeholder trust, so that the
mandated reforms are not necessary even if there previously was a governance failure. Cf. Francois Brochet et al.,
Accountability of Independent Directors: Evidence from Firms Subject to Securities Litigation, 111 J. FIN. ECON.
430 (2014) (directors face greater discipline in the aftermath of fraud claims).
191. There is a large and long-standing body of literature on behavioral biases and agency costs in government
agencies, from which legal scholars have drawn. E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public
Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (1990);
Stephen Choi & Adam Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2003). These
include hindsight biases and attribution biases, which together make bad events more predictable and more the
product of a bad disposition than the facts would otherwise indicate. See Neal Roese & Kathleen Vohs, Hindsight
Bias, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 411 (2012). In law, see G. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L.
REV. 773, 771–78 (2004) and Langevoort, Monitoring, supra note 47, at 84, 89.
192. While there is empirical evidence to support the prediction that white collar crime prosecutors have
career-based incentives to be aggressive, reality is much more complex. A large body of literature on “cultural
capture” explores ways regulators become too accepting of existing power structures. See James Kwak, Cultural
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outcome to a bad culture, just as those inside firms are blinded to the same
possibility. Once a particular corporation is perceived as a wrongdoer, moreover,
there is little sympathy for complaints about future compliance costs. This harms
the subject of the prosecution, but also has spillover effects. These agreed-to
non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements193 may become models of
the normal for other firms when interpreted and retransmitted by lawyers and
compliance consultants. If costs are ignored or misunderstood, or benefits turn out
to be illusory, these problems are magnified.
A second useful lesson is much the same as what compliance offers have to
learn, but applies even more starkly. Compliance interventions have to be crafted
with a light touch or they will backfire. Perception matters. When prosecutions are
heavy-handed, or appear so to the business community, we’ve seen the reactance
that can occur.194 A reform that may be well-intentioned as a way of shedding the
bad organizational routines and habits that led to the alleged crime at a particular
firm can be interpreted as intrusive signs of mistrust to those who had nothing to do
with the misbehavior. As we’ve just seen, according to the behavioral literature,
cultures cannot become truly values-based if adopted under external pressure. The
harder enforcers push, the more the business goal simply becomes not getting
caught, or treating the penalties as a cost of doing business. The fine becomes a
price,195 and point B, or worse, is reinforced as compliance’s center of gravity.
Indeed, if culture is as important as theory and evidence suggest, the government-
backed arms race of expenditures on structural compliance monitoring and
surveillance, both human and cyber-based, could probably slow down. Monitoring
has its place, to be sure—nothing in our discussion of the crowding-out phenom-
enon suggests that oversight and discipline carefully aligned with the firm’s values
is either unnecessary or inappropriate. It’s just that absent Orwellian kinds of
surveillance,196 these tools have diminishing marginal returns when up against an
entrenched culture, and may inadvertently stoke resistance. Pro-sociality is more
likely to flourish in corporate cultures when the compliance environment is
cleansed of external pressure and threats. The same can be said about enforcer-
Capital and the Financial Crisis, in, PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW
TO LIMIT IT 73 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss, eds. 2014). To the extent that reform settlements are more
symbolic than real—and do not really threaten the autonomy of managerial incumbents—such settlements may,
as critics suggest, detract from doing justice. See Garrett, supra note 7. Corporations might welcome that to the
extent that culture shifts attention away from the more costly and intrusive structural changes to compliance and
governance that regulators might demand. See Griffith, supra note 2, at 2127–28.
193. Which are increasingly used by regulatory agencies like the SEC, not just DOJ. See Barnard, supra note
7; Gibson Dunn, Client Alert: 2015 Year End Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements and Deferred
Prosecution Agreements (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2015-Year-End-Update-
Corporate-Non-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx.
194. See sources cited supra note 146.
195. On the experimental evidence, see Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(2000).
196. See Fanto, supra note 11, at 1148–49.
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imposed compliance monitors.197 If cultural values come from within, it is
unlikely that a temporary compliance “czar” will contribute much and will face
much motivated resistance—masked by polite smiles and fawning acquiescence in
paper reforms—during his or her reign.198
All of these points underscore that enforcers have to be cautious and modest in
negotiating reform settlements. At the same time, they simply cannot leave
compliance—especially cultures of compliance—to firms to figure out for them-
selves. The main message of this article is how easily cultures under stress turn
self-serving. If the government takes no vocal role in articulating public norms of
corporate legal responsibility, it is not clear who will. The dark side wins the
internal debate a little too easily and often. Point A gets lost, in other words.
Corporations that celebrate the crucible of competition assume many risks, the
costs of which are felt widely in society and not fully internalized. In the end, a
culture of compliance is one where people really have come to believe in more
than internal rate of return in how those risks are managed. Pro-sociality needs a
boost that will often not come spontaneously from inside the firm.199
Thus, there is much to be said for a prosecutorial policy that takes into account
the cultures it finds in the course of prosecuting corporate misbehavior and judges
it against the socially expected ideal (point A). Charging and sanction decisions
should be affected, though by how much has to be highly fact-dependent.200 In
other words, enforcers should look and listen in the course of their investigations
for evidence of something more than compliance-speak in how the firm’s values
are articulated and promoted, giving salient credit when due for both effort and
achievement, and equally visible refusal when there appears to be neither. The key
function of this judgment is to give legitimacy and voice to the publicness of
corporate compliance, an expressive function. Beyond that, prosecutorial settle-
ment terms should exhibit restraint suitable to how much we still don’t know about
compliance, cultural and otherwise.
197. See O’Sullivan, supra note 6, at 67–70.
198. I leave to others the assessment of current policy about compliance monitors and how it might be
improved. See David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach
to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307 (2008). Hess and Ford are probably right to see the compliance
monitor more in the role of mediator, not an enforcer left behind to impose a new compliance order on the
vanquished.
199. To this end, Hess, supra note 198, calls for a revision to the OSG to insist on attention to values-based
compliance.
200. As Geoff Miller indicates, the amount of the credit or debit for compliance as a whole (culture included)
should be fairly moderate in light of the difficulties of judging accurately. See Miller, supra note 23. Realistically,
since most investigations are settled, corporations and their counsel will probably work hard to persuade the
government not to comment adversely on the culture.
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2. Ex Ante: Regulatory Monitoring
More and more, regulatory agencies are getting into the business of assessing
compliance without waiting for the kind of failure that makes the matter one for
enforcement in the first instance. This is often because the governing statute insists
on reasonable or adequate in-house risk controls, which encompass compliance
risks, or has an explicit standard of adequate supervision inside the firm. As noted,
this is particularly the case in securities and financial services regulation,201
especially after the financial crisis and its wide-ranging legislative response, the
Dodd-Frank Act. As technology evolves, the capacity to surveil and interdict on a
real-time basis is growing rapidly.202 Here, too, culture gets its due.
This subject is interesting not only as a legal matter but also because assessing
compliance takes on a purer form when there is no salient wrongdoing to
potentially bias the assessment. Inspections and examinations of the structural
aspects of compliance can be a mind-numbing review of written supervisory
procedures and their implementation, rarely yielding much except for gaps. No
doubt part of the new cultural emphasis is to redirect the dialog from details to
principles and push the widely-shared intuition that supervisory procedures are
more a matter of attitude and motivation than who does what, and when. Because
supervisory regulators see all firms, not just noncompliant ones, they are in a better
position than enforcers to identify the good, not just the bad, and spread the
message.
There is an important middle-ground legal issue here. Sometimes an agency like
the SEC discovers a compliance failure and a substantive violation. It will punish
the individual violator, and often the firm as well. It also has the authority to punish
supervisors, so does that mean it can or should go after compliance personnel who
may have missed the infraction?203 This is a sensitive issue because the penalties
(usually a temporary bar from work and a fine) are amplified by collateral
consequences: the penalty becomes a matter of searchable public record, and most
securities firms are naturally uneasy about hiring or retaining compliance person-
nel with a blot on their compliance record. Career consequences may be drastic.
The policy issues here are confounding. As we’ve seen, compliance is a struggle
as it is, encountering resistance both conscious and unconscious. Failures will
often not be compliance’s fault, especially when (as is usual) they have no
authority to fire. And we certainly don’t want to discourage compliance interven-
tions by imposing supervisory liability when the compliance official tries but fails.
Jim Fanto has drawn from the behavioral ethics literature noted earlier to argue
that, beyond all this, compliance needs to take on the role of internal firm
201. See Walsh, supra note 10, and Fanto, supra note 11, for descriptions of the SEC’s oversight of
broker-dealer and investment advisor supervisory procedures.
202. See Lo, supra note 154.
203. See Ted Urban, Avoiding Supervisory Liability, in LUI & WALSH, supra note 9, at 703.
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conscience, which will be undermined if the compliance role itself is subject to
overbearing external threats.204
All that is quite right, but produces a dilemma. Compliance personnel may take
responsibility for approving a particular decision or practice. Absolving them from
liability may lead to the situation where line personnel offer the excuse that they
got approval from compliance; compliance says they didn’t have direct supervi-
sory authority, so can’t be penalized. A fair concern from our study of compliance
cultures is that some in compliance can and do succumb to both cultural and
economic pressures, and, when they have essentially “thrown in their lot” with the
questionable behavior, deserve a penalty. That is the essentially the SEC’s position,
and presumably also the position of other regulators with similar statutory
authority, but that position is heavily criticized. The fear once again is that
thoroughly deregulating the compliance space in order to let conscience flourish
will instead leave the field open to the self-serving biases to which business
cultures are so subject. Regulators need to be very cautious about compliance
official liability, to be sure, but via moderation, not abandonment. As noted there
are doubts about regulators’ judgment in assigning blame after salient misconduct
within a firm, but not enough to advocate a liability-free zone.
That said, the examination and inspection process should be as threat-free as
possible when it comes to culture, for all the reasons Fanto gives. To borrow from
new governance scholarship, this should be the setting for the kind of dialog that
facilitates learning and responsiveness.205 Compliance is naturally fixated on point
B; regulators have to advocate for A, perhaps against heavy odds. The lessons for
regulators are in many respects the same as the message for well-meaning
compliance officials inside the firm: helping to rewrite scripts to wean people,
practices and cultures away from self-serving inference and motivated biases.206
Some questions and topics of conversation seem natural. Hiring, promotion, and
compensation are obvious subjects,207 but we have seen more subtle aspects of
common practices of aggressive goal-setting and the celebration of personalities
who exhibit an abundance of competitive arousal, creativity, or self-confidence.
The role of fairness in how people are (and feel) treated inside the firm is another
subject that deserves clear discussion. More broadly, it is worth raising questions
204. Fanto, supra note 11, at 1163–65.
205. See Baer, supra note 13, at 956; see also Hess & Ford, supra note 198; Cristie L. Ford, New Governance
in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial Regulation, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 101 (2010).
206. See Lee Augsburger, How Compliance Can Teach Ethics, and Michelle Hawkins, Soft Skills Presenting
Compliance, in LUI & WALSH, supra note 9, at 179, 207.
207. In securities, this would include the tendency of some firms to hire aggressively brokers with prior
disciplinary records, presumably on the (highly rationalized) belief that special supervision will work. See sources
cited supra note 143.
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about how free—indeed, responsible208—people feel to speak up and question, not
only about legal wrongdoing (whistle-blowing) but on any matter relating to firm
culture and firm performance. Whistle-blowing, which is important to compliance,
is more likely when not viewed as a stand-alone practice but part of a larger culture
of candor.209
It is naı¨ve to assume that the dialog between regulators and the regulated will be
particularly honest and soul-searching, given mutual suspicions. But a good faith
effort is the best route to a meaningfully internalized culture of compliance. These
conversations are worth having, skepticism notwithstanding.
CONCLUSION
Compliance—cultural and otherwise—inhabits the uneasy borderland between
the public and the private. Advocating a genuine culture of compliance takes
government prosecutors and regulators to a strange place. Culture is crucial to
compliance, but we are still early on the road to understanding how and why.
Pressing hard may make cultures more compliance resistant, not less. There are
costs to pushing a culture of compliance, some quite subtle and hidden. Compli-
ance norms affect risk-taking and creativity. The very idea of getting from B to A
involves the abandonment of corporate wealth maximization or efficiency as
primary norms, which is justifiable only if the interventions pay off in meaningful
social benefit, not political spittle. So it is difficult not to share the critics’ fear that
DOJ prosecutors, in particular, currently have neither the incentives nor evidence
to make accurate assessments or generate sensible policy for corporations to
follow in order to avoid further trouble.
But compliance has become a public norm, so that the necessary expectations
have to be generated publicly. Corporate governance will never suffice to produce
the desired attitude (an embrace of point A) even if all agency cost issues are
magically resolved. This effort is not meant to sound wildly idealistic, suggesting
that government policies on cultures of compliance can cultivate pro-social,
law-abiding forces inside the firm simply with an abundance of sunlight and care.
Once again, the crucial point is far less ambitious: how much worse things might
be without any pushback to the cultural tropes and scripts that enable the internal
lubricants to spread and become all the more slippery. Government enforcers may
have to undergo their own culture change to understand how to do this well, but
prosecutors and enforcers need to play their role, hopefully with the best knowl-
edge and tools available, in rewarding good corporate cultures and penalizing bad
ones.
208. Often forgotten is the fiduciary duty all agents have to the corporation to convey truthfully all material
information necessary for higher-ups to carry out their obligations. See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside
the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CINN. L. REV. 1187 (2002).
209. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards,
Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1176 (2010).
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I make no prediction about whether that will ever happen. But regardless of
whether the regulatory turn to culture is real or feigned, justifiable or illegitimate,
governmentally-induced compliance is here to stay. Those with compliance
responsibilities inside firms have to confront their own cultures every day. In the
end, the most important message about cultures of compliance is for corporate
leaders and, especially, for boards of directors.210 It is much too easy to look
around and see good people working hard at difficult jobs and assume that a good
compliance culture exists simply because everyone has been warned of the
damage that can come from getting caught doing wrong. Or worse, to assume that
an observable abundance of intensity, loyalty and creativity are signs that all is
good. Taking culture seriously—appreciating the opportunities for transmitting
values as well as anticipating the many hidden pathways of resistance and
denial—is a necessary step toward the sort of compliance that never attracts
prosecutors’ unwanted attention.
210. See Killingsworth, C-Suite, supra note 117; Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat:
Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving Others, and the Design of Internal
Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 317 (2004).
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